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IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
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ABSTRACT
This Article examines the long shadow cast on local policing by Terry v.
Ohio, tracing the impact of Terry’s progeny on state legislative campaigns
focused on immigration enforcement. The policing tools afforded by Terry’s
progeny have an unmistakable presence-deterring effect on communities
of color—so painfully illustrated in New York City during the siege-like
“stop-and-frisk” program—and have provided the foundation on which
states like Texas and Arizona can build statutory schemes to achieve “attrition through enforcement.” This Article unpacks how the broad police
power afforded by Terry and its progeny meets legislative provisions authorizing or mandating immigration inquiry at the lowest level encounter
with law enforcement. At this confluence, states can use Terry as a sword
to create an environment so hostile to undocumented immigrants that they
are under siege in their own communities and, ultimately, forced to leave.
This Article further discusses how to arm advocacy groups to fight the
harms of Terry and its progeny by seeking greater transparency and accountability through data collection on police encounters, while fighting
the harms of the state legislative campaigns by engaging immigrant employers in the fight to recognize and maintain the dignity of immigrants in
the United States.
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I. INTRODUCTION
If you’re in this country illegally and you committed a crime by being
in this country, you should be uncomfortable, you should look over your
shoulder. You need to be worried.1
Thomas Homan, Acting Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Director, during a House Appropriations Committee Hearing in June 2017.
The solution is to create “virtual choke points” . . . . [like] firewalls in computer systems, that people could pass through only if their legal status is
verified. The objective is not mainly to identify illegal aliens for arrest
(though that will always be a possibility) but rather to make it as difficult
as possible for illegal aliens to live a normal life here.2
Mark Krikorian, Executive Director, Center for Immigration Studies.
The commissioner of the New York City police department views the
controversial practice of stop, question and frisk as a means to instill fear
in young African American and Latino men, a New York state senator, [Eric
Adams,] testified in a federal court on Monday . . . .
“[Commissioner Kelly] stated that he targeted and focused on that
group because he wanted to instill fear in them that every time that they
left their homes they could be targeted by police,” Adams testified. 3

1. Stephen Dinan, No Apologies: ICE Chief Says Illegal Immigrants Should Live in Fear of Deportation, WASH. TIMES (June 13, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jun/13/thomashoman-ice-chief-says-illegal-immigrants-sho/.
2. Mark Krikorian, Downsizing Illegal Immigration: A Strategy of Attrition through Enforcement,
CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. 5 (May 2005), https://www.cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2005/back605.pdf.
3. Ryan Devereaux, NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly ‘Wanted to Instill Fear’ in Black and Latino
Men, GUARDIAN (Apr. 1, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/01/nypd-ray-kelly-instilfear.

2018

ERASING PRESENCE THROUGH REASONABLE SUSPICION: TERRY AND ITS
PROGENY AS A VEHICLE FOR STATE IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT

411

On May 14, 2017, artist Ricardo Levins Morales was riding on Minneapolis
Metro Transit when a transit officer began to move about the cabin checking passenger fares and asking for identification.4 An individual did not give him a sufficient
answer, and the officer asked this person, “Are you here illegally?”5
It was then that Morales asked the officer if he had been authorized to act on
the behalf of immigration enforcement.6 The officer replied, “No, not necessarily.” 7
In response, Morales said, “Then I would stay out of that[.] . . . It’s very touchy legal
territory.”8 The officer responded by arresting the subject, Ariel Vences-Lopez.9
After the incident was reported to Metro Transit, the Metro Transit Police
Chief issued a statement emphasizing that it was Metro Transit’s policy not to inquire about immigration status.10 This mirrored the Minneapolis and St. Paul Police
Department’s policies, which prevented officers from asking about people’s immigration status by city ordinance.11 But the damage was done: Mr. Vences-Lopez was
booked into the county jail, transferred into ICE’s custody, and scheduled for deportation to Mexico.12 Though he was later released on bond by an immigration
judge,13 Mr. Vences-Lopez’s future in the United States had been jeopardized by a
single, non-consensual interaction with local law enforcement, a very real example
for the undocumented immigrant community demonstrating that any encounter
with the police could mean losing a life in the United States.
On the fiftieth anniversary of Terry v. Ohio, it is fitting to examine the controlling power of non-consensual stops made with less than probable cause on undocumented immigrant communities. Terry has been a source of scholarly critique
about racial profiling: in New York, Terry stops were used to target the “right people” and had the impact of instilling fear in young men of color, leading them to

4. Associated Press, Video Shows Transit Officer Asking about Immigration Status, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (May 20, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2017-05-20/video-shows-transitofficer-asking-about-immigration-status.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Will Ashenmacher, Metro Transit: We Didn’t Note Immigration Status for Ariel Vences-Lopez,
TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS (May 27, 2017), https://www.twincities.com/2017/05/27/metro-transit-we-didntnote-immigration-status-for-ariel-vences-lopez/.
10. Amber Ferguson, ‘Are You Here Illegally?’: Probe Underway into Video of Transit Officer
Checking Rider’s Immigration Status, WASH. POST (May 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/05/22/are-you-here-illegally-minneapolis-probes-video-oftransit-officer-checking-riders-immigration-status/?utm_term=.8fa2711c487e.
11. Ibrahim Hirsi, For Undocumented Immigrants, the ‘Sanctuary City’ of Minneapolis Doesn’t
Feel Much Like a Sanctuary, MINN. POST (June 5, 2017), https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2017/06/undocumented-immigrants-sanctuary-city-minneapolis-doesnt-feel-much-sanctuar. In general, these ordinances, inter alia, have led to the Minneapolis-St. Paul area being labeled a “sanctuary city,”
even though the Minneapolis Mayor says she does not use the term: “I don’t want to overpromise what the
city can do.” Id.
12. Ashenmacher, supra note 9.
13. Mila Koumpilova, Immigration Judge Releases Man Detained After Light-Rail Confrontation,
STAR TRIB. (July 13, 2017), http://www.startribune.com/immigration-judge-releases-man-detained-afterlight-rail-confrontation/434313693/.
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believe that they could be stopped at any time for no reason.14 In the immigration
enforcement context, Terry’s deterrent effect allows state policymakers to endorse
the efforts of local enforcement officers to enforce immigration without entering
formalized agreements with ICE or violating principles of federalism by taking on
powers exclusively held by federal immigration authorities. By applying the tools of
policing, states can realize the twin political goals of eliminating sanctuary jurisdictions and encouraging the self-deportation of undocumented immigrants. They do
so by moving the spotlight from federal attempts to coerce local agencies to the
state arena, where legislative campaigns co-opt local officers to do the “heavy lifting” of self-deportation.
In the wake of President Donald Trump’s election, legislation concerning immigration began to proliferate in state legislatures, the number of bills enacted increasing by 110% in 2017 from the prior year.15 Many of these bills addressed “sanctuary policies”—local or state policies that limit or prohibit agency cooperation with
immigration authorities—by waging the same war of attrition through funding that
President Donald Trump has promised to wage.16 In response to the Administration’s position on immigration, other states like California reacted oppositely, expressing statewide support for sanctuary policies. 17 The federal government has
met state legislation reflecting federal immigration enforcement priorities with

14. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 602–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). See also Devereaux,
supra note 3.
15. State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS.,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/state-laws-related-to-immigration-and-immigrants.aspx (last
updated Jan. 1, 2018). Only one state nationwide did not enact any immigration-related legislation in 2017.
2017 Immigration Report, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS., http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/2017-immigration-report.aspx (last updated Feb. 12, 2018). Notably, legislative campaign trends concerning immigration
have come in reaction to political trends—2012 and 2013’s increase may have come as a result of DACA’s
implementation, while 2010’s increase may have been in response to Arizona S.B. 1070, the first omnibus
bill of its kind directed at immigration enforcement. State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants,
supra.
16. At the federal level, early in his first year, President Trump issued an embattled and ultimately enjoined executive order promising to deny federal funding to such sanctuary jurisdictions. Eli Rosenberg, Federal Judge Blocks Trump’s Executive Order on Denying Funding to Sanctuary Cities, WASH. POST
(Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/11/21/federal-judge-blockstrumps-executive-order-on-denying-funding-to-sanctuary-cities/?utm_term=.873ad50f3636. Analogously,
legislation introduced in Idaho and enacted in Texas threatened local agencies’ funding if they adopt, enforce, or endorse sanctuary policies. Betsy Z. Russell, Proposed Law in Idaho Would Discourage Sanctuary
Cities and Direct Law Enforcement to Question People’s Immigration Status, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Jan. 30, 2017),
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2017/jan/30/idaho-house-panel-introduces-immigration-bill-targ/;
Manny Fernandez, Federal Judge Blocks Texas’ Ban on ‘Sanctuary Cities’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/us/judge-texas-sanctuary-cities.html. Notably and most recently,
the federal government has even explored avenues to levy criminal charges against leaders of sanctuary
cities. Stephen Dinan, Homeland Security Pursues Charges Against Leaders of Sanctuary Cities, WASH. TIMES
(Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/jan/16/dhs-asks-prosecutors-charge-sanctuary-city-leaders/.
17. Ben Adler, California Governor Signs ‘Sanctuary State’ Bill, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 5, 2017),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/10/05/555920658/california-governor-signs-sanctuarystate-bill.
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praise,18 especially in light of constitutional issues implicated when the federal government strong-arms states into enforcing federal law.19
Multiple cases in lower courts are examining the role and scope of local officers in immigration enforcement.20 Some of these cases implicate issues of federalism, asking whether and how the federal government can coerce local law enforcement agencies to enforce immigration both pre- and post-arrest.21 Yet other cases
concern state legislation about post-arrest immigration enforcement—compliance
with detainers, for example, after an arrest for both minor and severe criminal violations.22 These direct pathways for local enforcement to feed undocumented im-

18. Julián Aguilar, In Austin, Sessions Touts Trump’s Hardline Stance on Immigration, TEX. TRIB.
(Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/10/20/austin-sessions-touts-trumps-hardline-stanceimmigration/. This has also extended beyond applause—U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions pledged Department of Justice support to Texas in the litigation that followed Texas S.B. 4’s passage. Philip Jankowski,
Trump Administration to Defend ‘Sanctuary Cities’ Ban in Texas Lawsuit, MY STATESMAN (June 23, 2017),
http://www.mystatesman.com/news/state--regional/trump-administration-defend-sanctuary-cities-bantexas-lawsuit/8r1fSKZtygM1bue8jkjmdI/.
19. See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). There, at issue were provisions of
the Brady Act that amended the Gun Control Act of 1968 by requiring state enforcement officers to help
enforce a federal gun control scheme—officers were directly conscripted to perform background checks on
handgun transferees. Id. at 935. The Court found that this direct conscription violated states’ autonomy
preserved in the constitutional system of dual sovereignty. Id. at 918–19. Furthermore, requiring state enforcement officers to enforce federal law violated separation of powers, as it was the role of the Executive
branch, not state enforcement officers, to enforce federal law. Id. at 922. In the immigration context, the
federal government would violate these principles of federalism if it required states to enforce federal immigration law, but would not violate these principles if states acted independently and engaged in what one
scholar has called “immigration federalism[:]” . . . “the engagement by national, state, and local governmental actors in immigration regulation.” See Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO ST.
L.J. 703, 709–10 (2013). Of course, as will be discussed infra in Section II.B, state action must also clear the
Constitutional hurdles of federal preemption. See infra Section II.B.
20. See City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F. Supp. 3d 744 (W.D. Tex. 2017), rev’d in part, 885 F.3d
332 (5th Cir. 2017); Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, City of Chi. v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d
933 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-5720); City of Chi. v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
21. President Trump’s Executive Order 13768, as implemented by the Attorney General’s accompanying Memorandum, set as a precondition for federal funding certification of the jurisdiction’s compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2012). Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017); Memorandum from the Attorney Gen. for all Dep’t Grant-Making Components (May 22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/968146/download. Though jurisdictions like the City of Chicago gained certification of compliance, the Department of Justice released press releases indicating it believed some jurisdictions had wrongfully earned certification, also levying further conditions on receipt of funds. Complaint
for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 20. These jurisdictions filed a complaint asking for a declaratory judgment that the conditions placed on federal funding were unlawful, as well as for an injunction
against the enforcement of the conditions. Id. This case, and cases like it, ask whether the federal government can leverage funding to force local jurisdictions to enforce immigration. Id.
22. Texas Senate Bill 4, enacted in 2017 and discussed infra in Section II.C, required local jurisdictions to comply with all detainer requests. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.251 (West 2017). A complaint
filed by the City of El Cenizo challenged major provisions of Senate Bill 4, and in particular raised the question
of whether states could force local jurisdictions to comply with all detainer requests despite concerns about
financial and constitutional costs. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, City of
El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F. Supp. 3d 744 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (No. 5:17-cv-404-OLG).
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migrants into the deportation pipeline through criminal convictions are not the focus of this Article.23 Extensive scholarship exists on the subject and addresses the
Fourth Amendment violations inflicted upon individuals subject to detainer.24
Another set of cases, however, concerns state legislation about pre-arrest immigration enforcement. Inter alia, provisions in Arizona’s 2010 omnibus bill, S.B.
1070, authorized warrantless stops based on probable cause of a subject’s unlawful
presence,25 and mandated that officers determine the immigration status of individuals during police encounters. 26 After the subsequent litigation that culminated
in the Supreme Court case Arizona v. United States,27 states had defined space in
the immigration enforcement field to occupy by mandating that officers determine
the immigration status of people who are lawfully stopped.28 This is the less-examined but more pervasive, indirect means of achieving the erasure of undocumented
immigrants; officers use tools that have been validated by the Court to instill fear,
discourage presence, and encourage self-deportation.
Self-deportation refers to immigration enforcement that makes life so miserable for undocumented immigrants that they leave. 29 This was the explicit goal of
Arizona S.B. 1070—to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of
aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present . . . .”30 This approach
acknowledges that formal deportation of all undocumented immigrants is unrealistic both practically and politically.31 By making jobs more difficult to obtain or requiring status verification at the “virtual chokepoints” referenced by Center for Immigration Studies Director Mark Krikorian,32 life becomes so difficult and filled with
fear that undocumented immigrants arrange their own departures, thus lessening
the load on ICE. Though the “self-deportation” approach is predominantly federal
in focus, states like Arizona, Texas, and even Idaho have entered the fray with bills
like S.B. 1070, designed to deputize local officers to enforce immigration. 33

23. For a discussion of the “jail-to-deportation pipeline” by triggering deportation through runins with local law enforcement that result in a criminal conviction, see Rebecca Sharpless, “Immigrants Are
Not Criminals”: Respectability, Immigration Reform, and Hyperincarceration, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 691 (2016). In
contrast, this Article focuses on interactions with law enforcement that may not even result in a criminal
charge.
24. See generally Alia Al-Khatib, Putting a Hold on ICE: Why Law Enforcement Should Refuse to
Honor Immigration Detainers, 64 AM. U.L. REV. 109 (2014); Christopher N. Lasch, Preempting Immigration
Detainer Enforcement under Arizona v. United States, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 281 (2013).
25. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act § 2(b), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §111051(B) (2010).
26. Id.
27. 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
28. See infra Section II.B.
29. Adam Serwer, “Self-Deportation”: It’s a Real Thing, and It Isn’t Pretty, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 24,
2012), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/01/romneys-self-deportation-just-another-term-alabama-style-immigration-enforcement/#.
30. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act § 1.
31. Wayne A. Cornelius, Why Immigrants Won’t Self-Deport, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2016),
http://beta.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-cornelius-self-deportation-20161130-story.html.
32. Krikorian, supra note 2, at 5.
33. Arizona’s Immigration Law Is Back in Court, “Self-Deportation” on the Rise, PUB. RADIO INT’L:
TAKEAWAY (Apr. 26, 2012), https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-04-26/arizonas-immigration-law-back-courtself-deportation-rise; Russell, supra note 16.
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ICE’s limited workforce and federal inaction with that workforce has been the
root of many states’ hyper-focus on local law enforcement agencies.34 ICE employs
approximately 12,000 officers to enforce immigration laws on estimates of up to
12.5 million undocumented immigrants. 35 Policymakers already know that direct
partnerships between local agencies and ICE provide the “highly successful force
multiplier” to deport, as lauded by Department of Homeland Security Secretary
John Kelly.36 More insidiously, however, states co-opt local officers into immigration
enforcement—requiring them to ask about immigration status through provisions
commonly known by opponents as “Show Me Your Papers” bills. 37 Even more telling
is that state legislatures passing provisions that keep local agencies from prohibiting
their officers from asking about immigration status—referred to in this Article as
“Can’t Keep Me From Asking” provisions38—are counting on local officers to carry
out anti-immigrant agendas with self-deportation at its core.
Not surprisingly, lobbyists and state legislators understand that encounters—
actual or feared—with local law enforcement is the most critical stage for immigration enforcement because of the prevalence of encounters with state and local officers.39 But the significance of these encounters extends beyond the direct pathways from criminal convictions to deportation. The indirect pathway of fear to self34. See Kevin J. Fandl, Putting States Out of the Immigration Law Enforcement Business, 9 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 529, 540 (2015); Kristen McCabe & Doris Meissner, Immigration and the United States: Recession Affects Flows, Prospects for Reform, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Jan. 20, 2010), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigration-and-united-states-recession-affects-flows-prospects-reform; Arizona is Not
the First State to Take Immigration Matters into Their Own Hands, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (May 26, 2010),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/arizona-not-first-state-take-immigration-matterstheir-own-hands.
35. According to ICE’s 2016 fiscal year budget, there are only about 12,000 agents—Enforcement
& Removal Operations (ERO) and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) combined—which has been
blamed for ICE being backlogged. Josh Keefe, How Many Immigration Border Officers Are There? Trump to
Increase ICE Enforcement Agents by 80%, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2017), http://www.ibtimes.com/howmany-immigration-border-officers-are-there-trump-increase-ice-enforcement-agents-2495482. For current undocumented immigrant estimates, see Alan Gomez, Undocumented Immigrant Population in U.S.
Stays Flat for Eighth Straight Year, USA TODAY (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/04/25/undocumented-immigrant-population-unitedstates/100877164/; Spencer Raley, How Many Illegal Aliens Are in the US?, FED’N FOR AM. IMMIGR. REFORM
(Oct. 23, 2017), https://fairus.org/issue/illegal-immigration/how-many-illegal-immigrants-are-in-us.
36. Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan et al.,
Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border Prot. 3 (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf).
37. See Audrey McGlinchy, How Does Texas’ ‘Sanctuary Cities’ Bill Stack up against Arizona’s
‘Show Me Your Papers’ Law?, AUSTIN MONITOR (May 5, 2017), https://www.austinmonitor.com/stories/2017/05/texas-sanctuary-cities-bill-stack-arizonas-show-papers-law/. The moniker “Show Me Your Papers” has been used to refer to provisions mandating or authorizing officers to determine a subject’s immigration status, but as will be discussed infra, I suggest a notable distinction between “Show Me Your Papers”
and the recent wave of “Can’t Keep Me from Asking” provisions. See infra Section III.C.
38. See infra Section III.C.
39. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local
Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 234–35 (2006). Kris Kobach, notably, went on to
assist in the drafting of S.B. 1070 with Russell Pearce. Russell Pearce, SB 1070 Is Working, HILL (Apr. 19,
2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/222597-sb1070-is-working.
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deportation is equally vital to achieve states’ immigration enforcement agendas.
When immigrants fear that their local law enforcement is enforcing immigration
law—not just serving and protecting the community—they are less likely to report
crimes or cooperate with local police.40 They are less likely to travel throughout
their communities for fear of being stopped.41 By co-opting local enforcement into
a broader force of immigration enforcement—and imbuing local enforcement with
the miasma of fear otherwise surrounding federal immigration enforcement (“la
migra”)42—state legislators can target sanctuary jurisdictions by systematically
making them feel unwelcome, thereby encouraging self-deportation. To do so,
state legislators must rely upon the full range of tools available to local law enforcement and count on local officers to carry out immigration enforcement alongside
their normal policing duties.43 Terry v. Ohio and its progeny are core to this strategy,
allowing for implementation by pervasive population control.44 State legislators
passing “Show Me Your Papers” or “Can’t Keep Me from Asking” provisions complement this control by mandating or authorizing immigration status determination
during stops that largely sit outside judicial review.45
Part I discusses Terry v. Ohio’s impact on race-based immigration enforcement. I first explore Terry’s significance for local criminal enforcement, as well as
the subsequent cases establishing the acceptable factors for reasonable suspicion.
Given Terry’s application and abuse in New York City, I discuss the danger of deep
injury in communities of color when stops on less than probable cause are constitutionally immunized. Part II examines the variable success of state initiatives to
enforce immigration law, setting forth the confines of federalism on enlisting local
enforcement as indicated in Arizona v. Johnson, discussing the avenues of direct
local partnership between counties and ICE, and fleshing out the space created by
the Court in Arizona v. Johnson. I argue that the new wave of state-led legislative
campaigns seeks to take up as much of this Court-created space as possible, regu-

40. Mai Thi Nguyen & Hannah Gill, Interior Immigration Enforcement: The Impacts of Expanding
Local Law Enforcement Authority, 53 URB. STUD. 302, 316 (2016).
41. Id. at 316–17; Andy Uhler, In the Texas Countryside, Undocumented Immigrants Live with a
Different Kind of Fear, MARKETPLACE (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.marketplace.org/2018/02/01/life/texascountryside-undocumented-immigrants-live-different-kind-fear.
42. Nguyen & Gill, supra note 40, at 316.
43. As will be discussed infra in Section II.A, these tools are amplified in § 287(g) jurisdictions
with the delegation of federal immigration authority; for an in-depth examination of the intersection of local
policing and immigration enforcement in the § 287(g) jurisdiction Nashville, Tennessee, see AMADA ARMENTA,
PROTECT, SERVE, AND DEPORT: THE RISE OF POLICING AS IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 3–4 (2017).
44. See infra Section II.B (discussing the pervasive population control experienced by minority
neighborhoods in New York City).
45. Notably, the cases establishing the boundaries of police search and seizure overwhelmingly
tend to be appeals from suppression motions where evidence was acquired during a search or seizure;
searches or seizures that do not lead to arrests or evidence may of course be challenged through § 1983
actions (discussed infra in Section IV.A), but are not automatically subject to judicial review through probable cause hearings (for arrests) or suppression hearings (for evidence). See also infra Section III.A. This becomes particularly relevant when the only “evidence” at issue is a subject’s identity; for the undocumented
immigrant, the fact that identity evidence cannot be suppressed can mean any encounter with police can
lead to severe immigration consequences with no recourse even if the encounter was entirely suspicionless.
See, e.g., Immigr. & Nationalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct.
2056 (2016).
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lating within the confines of Arizona and in doing so, mandating—or at least authorizing—enforcement at the local level through the actions of individual police officers.
In Part III, this Article discusses the confluence of Terry and these state legislative campaigns, arguing that the sheer power of a “reasonable suspicion” standard at the local law enforcement level when used to amplify the political goal of
deportation—or self-deportation—harms immigrant communities by using its “deterrent” effect to erase immigrant presence. Part IV examines the challenges to a
litigation response of confronting racial profiling, especially in the immigration
realm. The Article argues that major structural obstacles to equal protection challenges make advocating for data collection a necessity for advocacy groups, but that
the most effective short-term solution is engaging industries that employ immigrants. Then, the Article ultimately concludes that advocacy groups must be fully
aware of the way states use the lowest level of policing encounters as broadened
by Terry to create environments so hostile to immigrants that they leave. Armed
with this knowledge, advocacy groups must push for data collection and industry
engagement together, lest reliance on immigrant employers discount the human
dignity of immigrant populations.
II. TERRY’S LONG SHADOW ON RACE-BASED ENFORCEMENT
Encounters with state and local law enforcement are governed by the Fourth
Amendment, which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.46 The
Fourth Amendment requires a warrant supported by probable cause for a search or
a seizure to be valid.47 The reasonableness of a search or seizure is determined by
balancing the government’s protection of public interests and the individual’s right
to be free from invasions of privacy. 48 The Court establishes through precedent
what will be considered reasonable, and, by this blueprint, agencies establish policies governing encounters with the civilian population and protecting rights for citizens.49 A significant way to deter violations of the Fourth Amendment was the application of the exclusionary rule—suppression of evidence acquired during an unlawful search or seizure.50
Probable cause, required by the Fourth Amendment, has been the touchstone
of valid searches and seizures and is defined as “a fair probability” that the person

46. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment was incorporated to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment by the Supreme Court’s decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
48. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968) (citing Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–
37 (1967)).
49. See generally Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L.
REV. 929 (1965); I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality
Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2011) (arguing that criminal procedure developed in Supreme
Court cases between the 1920s and 1960s were concerned with “the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of
equal citizenship”).
50. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649 (1961).
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being arrested committed the crime charged, or that the thing being searched contains the evidence police are looking for.51 Though, as time went on and exceptions
were added—exigencies, for example, would excuse an officer from having to get a
warrant before entering a home52—probable cause remained the required standard to determine that the exception was valid.
Before Terry v. Ohio, there were two kinds of police encounters with the public
that were recognized by the Court. If voluntary, an officer did not need to justify
the interaction with probable cause, but if she had probable cause to arrest for
criminal behavior, she could.53 In the decades before Terry, probable cause was easy
to establish because of anti-loitering or vagrancy laws, which were prevalent until
the late 1960s and rendered otherwise innocent behavior criminal.54 But as these
laws fell into disuse, there was a new need for the courts to examine encounters in
light of Fourth Amendment concerns and for police to justify these encounters.55
In Terry v. Ohio, the Court was presented for the first time with the question
of whether the Fourth Amendment protected citizens from “sidewalk searches and
seizures . . . where the purpose of the detention was an investigatory stop, rather
than an arrest.”56 Faced with the prospect of suppressing evidence found when an
officer searched three individuals he suspected were about to commit armed robbery,57 the Court took the opportunity to constitutionalize two policing tools utilized by the officer—the stop and the frisk—and set forth different standards for
each.58
As relayed by Justice Warren in the Court’s opinion in Terry, the facts were
these: an experienced beat cop-turned-detective, Officer Martin McFadden, was
patrolling in downtown Cleveland when he encountered two men standing on a
street corner: John Terry and Richard Chilton.59 Officer McFadden testified that he
had been a detective for a long time and that he knew that the individuals in question “didn’t look right to [him] at the time.”60 His interest piqued, Officer McFadden
began to observe the two from about 400 feet away, and what he saw “[gave him]
51. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
52. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978).
53. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976).
54. William J. Stuntz, Terry’s Impossibility, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1213, 1215–16 (1998) (explaining
that around this time loitering and vagrancy laws were falling to challenges of vagueness).
55. Id. See also William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 559–60 (1992) (“[T]he scope of police authority to make brief street stops became
a hard issue only in the mid- to late 1960s, when loitering and vagrancy laws were struck down on vagueness
grounds (so that the police needed to find some other justification for street stops). Only after the courts
constrained the power to define crimes did Fourth Amendment standards come to mean something on city
streets.” (footnotes omitted)).
56. Robert V. Ward, Consenting to a Search and Seizure in Poor and Minority Neighborhoods: No
Place for a Reasonable Person, 36 HOWARD L.J. 239, 242 (1993). Notably, one issue first confronted in Terry—
the constitutionality of stopping and questioning pedestrians without probable cause—had been lamented
as being ignored by courts; in rapid-fire succession the Court addressed this issue not in one but three cases
total in the same session. Wayne R. LaFave, “Street Encounters” and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters,
and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 40–42 (1968).
57. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 4–6 (1968).
58. Id. at 27.
59. Id. at 5.
60. Id.
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more purpose to watch them . . . .”61 He watched one leave the other and go to a
store window, then walk on, then return, looking back into the same store window
before rejoining his companion; at some point they met up with a third man, a man
later identified as Katz.62 Based on these observations, Officer McFadden believed
that Terry and Chilton were casing stores for an armed stickup.63 He stopped the
three men, asked their names, and upon receiving mumbling responses he patted
down all three; finding guns on Terry and Chilton, he arrested all three men.64 The
two charged with carrying concealed weapons sought to suppress the guns that
were found; their motions were denied, they were convicted, and they appealed.65
There were two components to the issue before the Court in Terry: the stop
and the frisk. Because the case was before the Court due to the denied suppression
motion, Justice Warren, in speaking for the Court, drew a narrow boundary around
the question to be answered.66 To answer this narrow question, however, the Court
had to decide whether the seizure (the initial stop) and the search (the subsequent
frisk yielding the evidence in dispute) were valid under the Fourth Amendment.67
The Court ultimately answered both in the affirmative.68
In its reasoning, the Court dispensed with the State’s arguments that the stop
was not a seizure and that the frisks were not searches, even acknowledging that
being frisked was not a “petty indignity.”69 On the other hand, the Court also rejected the petitioners’ argument that any non-consensual encounter with police required probable cause.70 Instead, the Court constitutionalized an intermediate
standard for a non-consensual stop, placing a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of
the interests of crime prevention and officer safety. 71 The intermediate standards
being crafted here—i.e., “reasonable suspicion” instead of probable cause for an
underlying nonconsensual stop, or reason to believe the subject was “armed and
presently dangerous” for a frisk72—called for deference to officers who needed to

61. Id. at 5–6.
62. Id. at 6–7.
63. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
64. Id. at 6–7.
65. Id. at 7–8.
66. Id. at 12 (“[T]he issue is not the abstract propriety of the police conduct, but the admissibility
against petitioner of the evidence uncovered by the search and seizure.”). See also Stephen A. Saltzburg,
Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 911, 920 (1998).
67. Terry, 392 U.S. at 15–16.
68. The case itself supports an inference that the seizure was valid, as the frisk would not have
been valid without the investigatory stop being valid. Id. at 30. However, this has been criticized by scholars;
Professor Saltzburg notes in an otherwise approving piece, that the Court skipped over the stop straight to
the frisk, “virtually ignor[ing]” whether the stop was a stop at all. Saltzburg, supra note 66, at 922. The failure
to provide substantial analysis for the stop itself is discussed infra as a significant criticism, for in order “[f]or
Terry to provide meaningful guidance, the Court needed to expand on this ‘trigger issue[.]’” Lewis R. Katz,
Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423, 444 (2004).
69. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16–17 (“emphatically reject[ing the] notion” that the “stop and frisk” Officer McFadden subjected Terry, Chilton, and Katz to did not rise to the level of a “‘search’ or ‘seizure’ within
the meaning of the Constitution”).
70. Id. at 11.
71. Id. at 28. See also Katz, supra note 68, at 424.
72. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24.
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take “swift action predicated upon [their] on-the-spot observations. . . .”73 In this
specific case, given the facts available to Officer McFadden—and by proxy, the
Court—the individual’s interest in his freedom to leave as well as his personal security was not as weighty as the interest in preventing crimes and protecting investigating officers. Thus, a two-fold holding emerged in Terry: (1) if an officer had reasonable suspicion based on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts,” warranted the intrusion of a temporary
stop, he could conduct a non-consensual stop to investigate; and (2) if the officer
had reason to believe that the person he had stopped was armed and presently
dangerous, he could conduct “a carefully limited search of the outer clothing” to
find weapons that could be used against him. 74 In so doing, the Court fashioned a
“compromise” standard that brought the practice of stop and frisk “within the
Fourth Amendment.”75
Even while giving this “needed tool” to police,76 the Court acknowledged the
already-palpable tension between the police community and minority groups.77
However, the Court offered a tepid shrug about the power of the exclusionary rule
to prevent the “wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain[.]”78 This
viewpoint of powerlessness is reflected in how the facts recited by the Court pointedly did not include mention of the petitioners’ race—they were both black, a fact
that has not escaped notice and criticism by scholars.79 This perceived futility of the
exclusionary rule to prevent this harassment seems like a shrug aimed at those who
point at Terry’s consequences today: the harassment would have happened anyway, even if the exclusionary rule was applied to suppress evidence discovered as a
result.80
This Part discusses Terry’s impact in the cases that further fleshed out the facts
that would suffice as the basis for reasonable suspicion. It discusses how these

73. Id. at 20.
74. Id. at 21, 29.
75. See David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgements: Supreme Court Rhetoric versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 975, 984 (1998); Susan Bandes, Terry
v. Ohio in Hindsight: The Perils of Predicting the Past, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 491, 492–93 (1999).
76. Katz, supra note 68, at 429.
77. Terry, 392 U.S. at 14–15.
78. Id. at 14. See also Katz, supra note 68, at 443 (“The Court seemed resigned to its powerlessness: that no matter how it ruled in Terry, it would have little impact on the streets because no matter the
rule, police would not obey it.”).
79. I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 64 (2009).
80. Katz, supra note 68, at 442.
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cases—referred to in this Article as Terry’s progeny81—established race or race-correlative facts as acceptable reasons to make police stops.82 This Part also discusses
how the gaps in Terry have been filled in by the Court’s hand-wave of pretextual
stops in Whren v. United States. This Part then explores leading criticisms of Terry’s
“reasonable suspicion” standard and examines the shockwaves of harm to minority
communities that race-based policing has inflicted.
It should be noted, I am not arguing that Terry v. Ohio, with the advent of the
“reasonable suspicion” standard, created racial profiling. The Court in Terry
acknowledged the risk of over-policing in the minority community and that this risk
was already a reality for some jurisdictions.83 Neither am I conflating Terry with its
progeny. However, I argue that the lowering of the standard for a non-consensual
encounter with law enforcement helped to legitimize racialized local policing. 84
Consequently, Terry’s significant implications amplify immigration enforcement
when co-opted by state legislation.85
A. Terry’s Progeny: Immunizing Race-Based Policing Against Fourth Amendment
Challenges
After Terry, the die was cast. Police officers now had Court-sanctioned discretion to utilize the new intermediate standard. In the years following Terry, the term
“reasonable suspicion” was widely relied upon, but it was left to applying courts to
decide what specific facts would pass muster.86 As time passed and the lower courts
continued to apply the reasoning in Terry to define permissible grounds for stops,87

81. In scholarship, the phrase “Terry’s progeny” has differing meanings depending on the author’s focus; for example, Professor Capers has included Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) and
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) as Terry’s progeny. Capers, supra note 79, at 74. Professor
Harris has generally referred to Terry’s progeny as cases expanding, demarcating, or clarifying factors of
reasonable suspicion, including such cases as Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), Brown v. Texas, 443
U.S. 47 (1979), United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), and United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989)
(inter alia). See generally David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 661–67, 677 (1994). I recognize that this treatment of “Terry’s progeny”
can implicate “thousands of cases,” as the Fifth Circuit notes. United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 447
(5th Cir. 2010). Therefore, in this Article, I draw attention to Supreme Court cases following Terry v. Ohio
that do or may implicate race or ethnic appearance, in particular United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873 (1975), United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), Brown v. Texas, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528
U.S. 119 (2000), and Whren v. United States.
82. See infra Section I.A, in particular notes 89–118 and accompanying text.
83. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1968).
84. See Katherine A. Macfarlane, The Danger of Nonrandom Case Assignment: How the Southern
District of New York’s “Related Cases” Rule Shaped Stop-and-Frisk Rulings, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 199, 215
(2014).
85. See infra Part III (discussing the confluence of Terry’s legacy and state efforts to co-opt policing tools to deter the presence of undocumented immigrants).
86. Harris, supra note 75, at 985–87. Here, Professor Harris observes that the Supreme Court
stuck generally to the script provided by Terry, but that lower courts pushed the envelope in applying Terry:
“Regardless of the Supreme Court’s rhetorical reassurances, the law as applied by lower courts has moved
away from the Court’s insistence on individualized suspicion.” Id. at 987 (emphasis added).
87. Harris, supra note 75, at 988 (“[T]he reasons courts accept as legitimate bases for stops make
a great deal of difference.”).
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the consequence of Terry for local criminal enforcement became clear: officers suspecting criminal activity could stop individuals based in part on race when relevant
to particularized suspicion, as well as the race-correlative socioeconomic factors of
location and evasion.88
Of course, race may be relied upon by officers who are working with a description of a known suspect.89 The water is muddied, however, when police use race as
“a factor in deciding which person in a group of strangers is more likely than others
to be involved in some as-yet-unknown crime.”90 Though “racial profiling” is a term
that engenders significant controversy,91 the Court itself has hand-waved in race or
race-correlative factors as potentially relevant for the reasonable suspicion standard through a series of cases flowing from Terry v. Ohio, each requiring “less and
less evidence for a stop and frisk.”92
In the years following Terry, the Court concluded that the Constitution did not
prohibit deciding whether or who to stop, question, and frisk based at least in part
on race; this was established through a pair of cases in 1975 and 1976. United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce was the first to do so, holding that Border Patrol could not base a
stop for reasonable suspicion of alienage solely on an individual’s appearance.93
There, Border Patrol officers stopped an automobile for the sole reason that its
three occupants were of Mexican appearance, believing them to be present in the
country unlawfully.94 This, the Court decided, was insufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion.95 However, the Court emphasized the government’s interest in conducting such stops,96 and provided a list of acceptable relevant factors, including
88. Thomas B. McAffee, Setting Us Up For Disaster: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Terry v.
Ohio, 12 NEV. L.J. 609, 615 (2012) (observing that even though the Supreme Court stated that presence in a
“high-crime area” or association with drug users would not itself constitute reasonable suspicion, later
courts “regularly [found] adequate grounds for suspicion based on factors similar to those initially found
insufficient”) (citing David A. Harris, supra note 81, at 672–75).
89. David A. Harris, Using Race or Ethnicity as a Factor in Assessing the Reasonableness of Fourth
Amendment Activity: Description, Yes; Prediction, No, 73 MISS. L.J. 423, 435 (2003).
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Evan Horowitz, A Look at Racial Profiling, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 1, 2015),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/11/01/what-are-arguments-for-and-against-racial-profiling/F0DlnqVZk7aUXolRuHc0LJ/story.html; Ranjana Natarajan, Racial Profiling Has Destroyed Public Trust in
Police. Cops Are Exploiting Our Weak Laws Against It., WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/12/15/racial-profiling-has-destroyed-public-trust-in-police-copsare-exploiting-our-weak-laws-against-it/?utm_term=.762ebdfa5f98. See also George Higgins et al., Exploring the Influence of Race Relations and Public Safety Concerns on Public Support for Racial Profiling During
Traffic Stops, 12 INT’L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 12, 18 (2010) (examining public perception of whether racial
profiling exists, is widespread, and is justified).
92. Harris, supra note 81, at 660. Professor Harris writes that gradually, the Court began to explicitly call for more deference to police officers working the beat. Id. at 665. The “whole picture” concept
that emerged from United States v. Cortez, for example, “directly instructed lower courts to defer to the
judgment of police.” Id. at 666. This deference explicitly was in favor of the common-sense conclusions
arrived at by police officers; these “common-sense conclusions” were relied upon in later cases dealing with
drug courier profiles to justify police action based on “certain broad categories that, in collective police
experience, describe a person” likely engaged in criminal activity. Id.
93. 422 U.S. 873, 886 (1975).
94. Id. at 875.
95. Id. at 886.
96. Id. at 881, 878–79 (acknowledging public interest in “prevent[ing] the illegal entry of aliens
at the Mexican border” due to job scarcity or the implicated extra burdens on social safety nets).
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the “characteristic appearance” of someone living in another country.97 While at
face value this perhaps seemed like a victory against racial profiling (i.e., stops could
not be based solely on race), the Court’s reasoning relied on the belief that Mexican
appearance increased the likelihood of alienage.98 Brignoni-Ponce clearly cemented
the Court’s approval of race in conjunction with other factors. Justice Douglas concurred in the judgment but lamented “the weakening of the Fourth Amendment”
as an already weak reasonable suspicion standard had “come to be viewed as a legal
construct for the regulation of a general investigatory police power[,]” allowing
stops on “the flimsiest of justifications.” 99 The significance of this decision for local
policing also became clear, as after Brignoni-Ponce, law enforcement could rely on
“Mexican appearance” as a factor—though not the sole one—to make stops.100
A year after Brignoni-Ponce, in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,101 the Court
took up a case with remarkably similar facts to Brignoni-Ponce, except “the defendants were stopped and apprehended not by a roving patrol, but at a fixed checkpoint.”102 In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court ruled that the decision of an officer to refer
a vehicle for secondary inspection did not have to be based on individual suspicion,
and that Mexican appearance could be one of several factors for this decision.103
“[I]t is constitutional,” the Court said, “to refer motorists selectively to the
secondary inspection area . . . on the basis of criteria that would not sustain
a roving-patrol stop. Thus, even if it be assumed that such referrals are
made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry, we perceive no
constitutional violation.” . . . A person’s ancestry, as manifested in his appearance, could indeed form at least part of the basis for an enforcement
officer’s decision about whom to stop, question, and search.104

97. Id. at 886–87.
98. Id. (“The likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to
make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing alone it does not justify stopping all MexicanAmericans to ask if they are aliens.”). Notably, the Ninth Circuit has since departed from this dictum, concluding in United States v. Montero-Camargo that the significant demographic changes to the Southwest
and Far West made race “of such little probative value that it may not be considered as a relevant factor
where particularized or individualized suspicion is required.” United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d
1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000). See also Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of
the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious
Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1033 n.159 (2010).
99. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 889, 890 (Douglas, J., concurring).
100. Johnson, supra note 98, at 1009. See also Harris, supra note 89, at 43031 (“[W]hile BrignoniPonce appears to restrict the use of ethnic appearance as a factor in deciding whether reasonable suspicion
exists, it actually does so only in the most narrow sense: in situations where ethnic appearance is the only
factor involved. And it leaves the door open to using ethnic appearance when it is among several factors.”).
101. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
102. Harris, supra note 89, at 431.
103. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 563.
104. Harris, supra note 89, at 432 (quoting Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 563).

424

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 54

Understandably, the Court seemed cautious to apply the reasoning from a
border patrol case to those within the country’s interior.105 After all, the role of border patrol may extend from enforcing criminal violations of the Immigration and
Nationality Act to enforcing civil violations.106 However, the appearance of alienage
was relevant to the criminal violation suspected or discovered—illegal smuggling,
in both cases.107 In both Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte, the Border Patrol of-

105. JODY FEDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31130, RACIAL PROFILING: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 5
(2012). In acknowledging this caution, I would like to point out that the term “reasonable suspicion” has
similar implications for ICE officers as it does local law enforcement; all searches and seizures are subject to
Fourth Amendment review. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). An ICE officer can
ask questions of anyone she believes to be an alien, but must have reasonable suspicion that the individual
is “engaged in an offense against the United States or is an alien illegally in the United States” in order to
briefly detain him for questioning. 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(2) (2017). An ICE officer may even arrest without a
warrant if she has reasonable suspicion that the individual is violating immigration laws, if there is a likelihood of the individual’s escaping “before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2)
(2012); 8 CFR § 287.8(c)(2) (2017). Unlike state officers, ICE officers are authorized to enforce both civil and
criminal immigration violations. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA & KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41423,
AUTHORITY OF STATE AND LOCAL POLICE TO ENFORCE FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW 10 (2012). As it plays out on the
ground, “reasonable suspicion” is no different in practice between ICE and state officers except for jurisdiction of enforcement; ICE officers can use Terry and its progeny to target those who most look like they are
undocumented aliens.
106. The most significant difference between these two types of violations is that civil immigration violations generally can only be enforced by federal immigration authorities (or those delegated federal
power through partnerships with the federal government—see infra Section III.A) whereas criminal immigration violations can be enforced by both federal and state authorities. GARCIA & MANUEL, supra note 105,
at 10. Therefore, that federal immigration and border patrol authorities were the officers in question in
Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte does not necessarily preclude these cases’ later application, as they
were enforcing violations that local law enforcement could also enforce. See generally United States v. Ramos, 629 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Rogers, 244 Fed. Appx. 541 (5th Cir. 2007); United States
v. Abbott, No. CRIM. H-05-309, 2005 WL 2591007 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2005); United States v. Travis, 837 F.
Supp. 1386, 1394–96 (E.D. Ky. 1993). However, to the author’s knowledge, the application of these nuances
of Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte has been limited to immigration violations, both civil and criminal.
See Farag v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 436, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
To the Court's knowledge, no court has ever marshaled statistics to conclude that racial or
ethnic appearance is correlated with, and thus probative of, any type of criminal conduct
other than immigration violations. . . .
....
. . . Notably, the Supreme Court has never revisited its dictum in Brignoni-Ponce, nor has
it ever addressed whether, absent compelling statistical evidence, race or ethnicity may be
used as a factor in the Fourth Amendment calculus to indicate criminal propensity.;
United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 1997) (refusing “to adopt, by analogy, the concept that ‘the
likelihood that any given person of African ancestry is involved in drug trafficking is high enough to make
African ancestry a relevant fact’ in investigating drug trafficking at the airport.”) (quoting Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. at 886–87); United States v. Andrews, No. 8:05CR139, 2005 WL 4753403, at n.2 (D. Neb. Nov. 1,
2005) (“The requirement of individualized suspicion is relaxed only in limited circumstances that involve
important governmental interests or immediate hazards. . . .”); United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d
1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The likelihood that in an area in which the majority–or even a substantial part–
of the population is Hispanic, any given person of Hispanic ancestry is in fact an alien, let alone an illegal
alien, is not high enough to make Hispanic appearance a relevant factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus.”).
107. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 874–75; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 550.
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ficers stopped defendants on suspicion of criminal immigration violations—knowingly transporting illegal immigrants in violation of the Immigration Nationality
Act.108 In these cases, the Court found that appearance of alienage by way of race
was relevant to officers in “detecting illegal entry and smuggling[,]”109 and that race
could be dispositive for choosing to refer drivers for increased levels of search and
seizure on suspicion of illegal entry and smuggling. 110 Even though the Court had
been clear in Terry that it would not sanction “intrusions . . . based on nothing more
substantial than inarticulate hunches,”111 these cases working together gave law
enforcement the ability to point to racial or ethnic characteristics when viewed as
predictive of criminal activity.112
Race was even further highlighted in the metaphorical constellation of facts
that could constitute reasonable suspicion as lower courts struggled with the use of
two factors together—that of location and evasion.113 An individual’s presence in a
“high crime area” was dismissed by the Court as a sole factor for reasonable suspicion in Brown v. Texas, where the sole basis of the stop was the subject’s presence
in an area known for narcotics trafficking. 114 As it did in Brignoni-Ponce, by leaving
unanswered the question of whether presence in a high crime area could ever be
part of the basis for reasonable suspicion, the Court implied that it could be.115
Evasion—walking away from or avoiding encounters with police—was a mixed
bag: lower courts split on whether evasion could constitute a sole basis for reasonable suspicion, with four courts determining that it could and a number of states
and circuits finding that it could not.116 Even though the Court had stated unequivocally that an individual has the constitutional right to avoid the police, the courts
accepting evasion as grounds for reasonable suspicion equated avoiding the police
with guilt.117 It was not until 2000 that the Court examined and upheld a Terry stop
in Illinois v. Wardlow, based on the two factors: flight from the police in an area
known for heavy narcotics trafficking. 118 Here, the Court also pointed out that
“nervous, evasive behavior” was also a relevant factor. 119 As observed by Professor
Harris, “allowing stops based only on the fact that the individual observed falls into
the category of having an unusual reaction to the police is likely to sweep in many
people as suspects without any real suspicion of their involvement in criminal activity.”120
108. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 875; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 547–48.
109. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).
110. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 563.
111. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
112. See Harris, supra note 89, at 452–53.
113. Harris, supra note 81, at 674.
114. 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
115. Harris, supra note 81, at 672.
116. Id. at 673 n.137. The Eighth Circuit as well as the Minnesota, Indiana, and Wisconsin Supreme
Courts have considered avoiding police as sufficient basis for reasonable suspicion by itself. Id. See also Harris, supra note 75, at 993 n.80.
117. Harris, supra note 81, at 674 n.138.
118. 528 U.S. 119, 121 (2000).
119. Id. at 124.
120. Harris, supra note 75, at 996.
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While not expressly race-based, using location and evasion together targets
minorities because all too often “high crime areas” are coded terms for “inner city
neighborhoods,” where class and race segregation near-overlap.121 Professor David
Harris writes that this segregation leads to the synonymy of minority neighborhoods and higher crime and springs from a number of socioeconomic factors causing minorities to live and work in these neighborhoods.122 These “high crime” areas
are frequently the focus of “hot spot policing,”123 a police strategy that has received
significant praise for effectiveness in targeting “small units of geography with high
rates of crime.”124 Hot spot policing strategies are varied, but may be as simple as
police officers spending more time at “hot spots.”125 As a result, however, minorities may be caught in a vicious cycle of avoiding encounters with police because
they are more likely to be stopped due to where they live and being more likely to
be stopped because they avoid encounters with police.126 Yet as the influence of
Terry is traced through cases the law “effectively allows police nearly complete discretion to stop [minorities] . . . in crime-prone urban neighborhoods.”127
Significantly, it was a case that does not flow directly from Terry—and therefore does not necessarily qualify as Terry’s progeny—that helps fill the gaps of the
Court’s allowance of race in policing on less than probable cause.128 In Whren v.
United States, vice officers in southeast Washington, D.C. saw a dark SUV with two
black occupants stopped at a stop sign in a “high drug area”;129 suspecting drug activity but without any evidence other than the race of the occupants, their location,
and the car they were driving, the officers were making a U-turn to follow the SUV
when it made a sudden right turn without signaling and sped off. 130 The officers
pursued, stopped the SUV, and discovered large amounts of crack cocaine and
other drugs inside the vehicle.131

121. Harris, supra note 81, at 677.
122. Id. at 678 (“African Americans and Hispanic Americans find themselves segregated into
crime-prone locations. . . . By virtue of their relative socioeconomic status, not to mention persistent racial
discrimination, African Americans and Hispanic Americans find themselves living in the very areas of cities
labeled ‘high crime areas’ and ‘drug trafficking locations.’”(footnotes omitted)).
123. See Hot Spots Policing, CTR. FOR EVIDENCE-BASED CRIME POL’Y, http://cebcp.org/evidence-basedpolicing/what-works-in-policing/research-evidence-review/hot-spots-policing/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2018).
124. Id. See also Lawrence Rosenthal, Pragmatism, Originalism, Race, and the Case Against Terry
v. Ohio, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 299, 323 (2010) (attributing the late 1990s crime drop in New York City to hot
spot policing).
125. Hot Spots Policing, supra note 123.
126. Harris, supra note 81, at 680. See also Harris, supra note 75, at 1000.
127. Harris, supra note 75, at 1000.
128. As discussed supra note 81, the definition of “Terry’s progeny” in this Article extends to cases
that expand, demarcate, or clarify factors of reasonable suspicion. Thus, Whren v. United States—dealing
with probable cause and pretextual stops—is not a case that naturally flows from the creation of the Terry
stop-and-frisk standard. I include United States v. Whren in my discussion, however, because this case highlights the Court’s disinterest in the subjective motivation of the stopping officer. Johnson, supra note 98, at
1061. This—and the Court’s insistence that an Equal Protection Clause claim was the remedy, not application of the exclusionary rule—is particularly relevant in my discussion of the structural obstacles to litigating
a remedy. See id. at 1061–62; see infra Part IV.
129. 517 U.S. 806, 808, 811 (1996).
130. Id. at 808.
131. Id. at 808–809.
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On appeal from their convictions for possession with intent to distribute, the
defendants argued that the drugs discovered should be suppressed because the
traffic stop was pretextual: the stop was based on the assumption that young black
men in SUVs with temporary tags must be carrying drugs. 132 They asked the Court
to examine the motives of the officers performing the stop, underlining the need
for a “would have” test—“a stop is valid only if under the same circumstances a
reasonable officer would have made the stop, absent an impermissible purpose”133—instead of the pretextual stop-permitting “could have” test, where an officer can stop if there is probable cause of any sort, even for a minor infraction.134
The Court rejected the “would have” test, arguing that it would not be workable to
determine an officer’s state of mind on every single stop and that such a holding
would contradict other holdings regarding an acting officer’s motives in a search or
seizure.135 Improper motives (e.g., race) leading to disparate treatment could be
remedied instead through Equal Protection challenges, the Court stated, not
through application of the exclusionary rule.136
The Court’s refusal to examine an officer’s state of mind—and its assumption
that an Equal Protection claim could catch the officers with improper motives—cemented the expansive, pervasive role of policing requiring less than actual, particularized probable cause. First, Terry drew non-consensual encounters on less than
probable cause into the protection of the Fourth Amendment. 137 Though the Court
specified that ethnic appearance, presence in a high-crime area, and evasive or
avoidant behavior could not be used as the sole basis for a reasonable suspicion
stop,138 later cases emphasizing deference to officers’ judgment provided room for
lower courts to differ as to the use of these factors together.139 The significance of
Terry’s progeny, therefore, encompasses more than establishing which factors
would pass muster: it signaled an era of extreme deference to the training and experience of police officers. After Whren this deference meant a blind eye to evidence of improper motive if there was sufficient basis for a pretextual stop. 140
B. The Well-Documented Harms of Terry to Minority Populations
Terry v. Ohio and its progeny have faced severe criticism in the last fifty years.
A vast body of scholarship exists about the dangers of an ill-defined reasonable suspicion standard, how it gives officers excessive discretion to stop, and the “parlor
game” the courts encourage officers to play in justifying the stops. 141 Far more
deeply felt, however, are the harms inflicted on minority populations. As described
132. Johnson, supra note 98, at 1057.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1058.
135. Whren, 517 U.S. at 812–13.
136. Id. at 813.
137. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
138. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 887 (1975); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52
(1979); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 121–22 (2000).
139. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
140. Johnson, supra note 98, at 1061–62; see also Whren, 517 U.S. at 815.
141. United States v. Zapata-Ibarra, 223 F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2000) (Wiener, J., dissenting).
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in exhaustive detail in Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Utah v. Strieff, the tools given
to police—when exercised on less than adequate cause—provide “reason to target
pedestrians in an arbitrary manner.”142 The harms that result when the law brings
this targeting under Constitutional protection are felt deeply among minority communities. New York City’s stop-and-frisk program—also the subject of much scholarship—illustrates this well, showing the human impact of Terry.
The Court’s emphasis on “specific articulable facts” in Terry v. Ohio has been
criticized for the difficulty of pinning down its definition and the impossibility of
quantifying its weight.143 The Court stated that “inchoate” and “inarticulate
hunches” would not pass muster, but pointed only to the ability of an officer to
articulate specific facts—and the inferences he could draw from these facts based
on his experiences—to establish “reasonable suspicion.” 144 Professor Katz writes
that “[t]he Court failed to adequately define an ‘investigatory stop,’ leading later
courts to harden the definition[.]” 145 This has given rise to a vast constellation of
potential facts that can serve as the basis of reasonable suspicion; Judge Wiener of
the Fifth Circuit decried this in United States v. Zapata-Ibarra, pointing out the array
of often-contradictory factors allowed for a reasonable suspicion vehicle stop in
Fifth Circuit cases:
[T]he driver was suspiciously dirty, shabbily dressed and unkept or the
driver was too clean; . . . the driver would not make eye contact with the
agent, or the driver made eye contact too readily; the driver appeared
nervous (or the driver even appeared too cool, calm, and collected) . . .
and on and on ad nauseam.146
Quantifying reasonable suspicion—calculating the probability of criminal
wrongdoing—is even more difficult. Scholar William Stuntz proposes that if probable cause means it is “more-likely-than-not” crime will occur or has occurred, reasonable suspicion may be “something like a one-in-five or one-in-four chance.” 147
This difficulty of quantification is partially due to courts’ reliance on reasonable suspicion’s relationship with probable cause: “[r]easonable suspicion requires some
degree of certainty, which is less than probable cause, and police must articulate
the grounds for that suspicion.”148 As a result, reasonable suspicion is a constitutionally immunized standard that justifies a stop even when it is more probable that
the subject is, in fact, innocent of any suspected criminality.
More concerning than the difficulty of quantifying “reasonable suspicion” is
the fact that “[i]n most stops and frisks, the articulable suspicion is simply
wrong.”149 As a result of a settlement regarding the NYPD’s broad use of stop and
142. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
143. William J. Stuntz, Terry’s Impossibility, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1213, 1215 (1998) (“[R]easonable
suspicion has never received a solid definition. (Perhaps it can’t.)”).
144. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 27 (1968).
145. Katz, supra note 68, at 429.
146. Zapata-Ibarra, 223 F.3d at 282–83.
147. William J. Stuntz, Terry and Substantive Law, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1362, 1362 (1998).
148. Erica Goldberg, Getting Beyond Intuition in the Probable Cause Inquiry, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 789, 797 (2013).
149. Capers, supra note 79, at 63.
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frisk, the department was required to track its stop and frisks.150 This data was a
great boon for plaintiffs in the class-action bias suit (as most jurisdictions do not
require stop data to be tracked); the data showed that of more-than-half-a-million
stops over a single year, only about 50,000 led to arrests or summons.151 Jeffrey
Fagan—the plaintiffs’ expert witness in Floyd—also analyzed the same set of data
to see if “reasonable suspicion” stops had any more crime reductive effect than
“probable cause” stops; they did not.152 As Fifth Circuit Judge Wiener emphasized
in Zapata-Ibarra, “Bragging about netting 30 apprehensions out of 200 stops is analogous to a major league baseball player's bragging about a .150 batting average—
hardly an all-star performance.”153
Ultimately, lowering of a standard for a stop—and expanding the factors to
allow for such stops—amplifies other tools allowing searches and seizures on less
than pure probable cause. This “array of instruments,” Justice Sotomayor wrote in
Utah v. Strieff, allows officers to “probe and examine” people—and use what they
find to confirm their initial hunches.154 Justice Sotomayor described in rapid-fire detail the full range of possible officer control, from a Terry “reasonable suspicion”
stop to pretextual stops allowed by Whren, from the factors allowed for a stop to
the searches that may follow incident to an arrest from any infraction or discovered
outstanding warrant, from the invasion of privacy at the stationhouse to the “civil
death” of discrimination flowing from an arrest record. 155 Most disturbing is that all
of these indignities can lawfully flow from stops where the chance that the subject
is innocent is far greater than the chance that the subject is not. Legitimizing this
conduct “implies that you are not a citizen of a democracy but the subject of a carceral state, just waiting to be catalogued.”156
Consequently, Terry’s legitimation of racial profiling has left deep scars on
communities of color, starting with harms experienced by individuals targeted by
race-based policing. Professor Stuntz theorized four types of harm experienced by
individuals as follows: (1) injury to the subject’s individual privacy rights (being
stopped, being patted down, or having containers searched); (2) “targeting harm”
(“the injury suffered by one who is singled out by the police and publicly treated
like a criminal suspect”); (3) injury flowing from treatment based on race (feeling
that the stop was based on the subject’s race); and (4) injury flowing from police

150. Darius Charney et al., Suspect Fits Description: Responses to Racial Profiling in New York City
(Sept. 29, 2010), in 14 CUNY L. REV. 57, 73–74 (2010).
151. Capers, supra note 79, at 63. The Floyd court relied heavily on the tracking data in determining the department practice widespread racial profiling and enjoining these practices. See Floyd v. City of
N.Y., 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). For a broad discussion of which jurisdictions require stop tracking,
see Michael Boren & Jonathan Lai, Patrolling for Bias, INQUIRER PHILLY DAILY NEWS (July 5, 2017),
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/racial-profiling-traffic-stop-philadelphia-police-pa-nj.html.
152. Jeffrey Fagan, Terry’s Original Sin, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 86 (2016).
153. United States v. Zapata-Ibarra, 223 F.3d 281, 284–85 (5th Cir. 2000) (Wiener, J., dissenting).
154. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the discovery of a subject’s outstanding warrant on an unlawful suspicionless stop does not break the link between
the original “poisonous tree” of the unlawful stop and the discovered “fruit” of the warrant).
155. Id. at 2069–70.
156. Id. at 2071.
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violence (both physical injury because of excessive force and fear that it will be applied).157 These harms work together to alienate members of the community from
authorities; in severe cases, such as in New York City, they deepen racial divisions
and create an environment of being “under siege.”158
New York City provides a telling illustration of the harms felt by communities
of color. Though “stop-and-frisk” was rendered a lawful police practice in New York
in 1964,159 the New York Police Department established an aggressive stop-andfrisk program by the late 1990s aimed at addressing the City’s crime problem in
certain high-crime neighborhoods.160 In 1999, this practice was challenged by a class
action lawsuit brought by the Center for Constitutional Rights in Daniels v. City of
New York; as part of the 2003 settlement the NYPD was required to track stop-andfrisk data and turn it over to the Center. 161 When released data indicated the City
was not complying with the terms of the settlement, the Center filed Floyd v. City
of New York.162
The data revealed that stops were targeted to very specific neighborhoods. At
night, a stretch of about eight blocks in Brownsville, Brooklyn, for example, would
be blanketed with police cruisers and officers patrolling the public housing complexes.163 Neighborhoods targeted were mostly neighborhoods of color, with the
least stops in white-dominant neighborhoods.164 Those targeted included kids in
middle school, and it was common knowledge it was because of skin color. 165 One
young man, fourteen-years-old, lamented that mere miles away, “white kids in
Manhattan have no idea cops can frisk you for no reason[.]”166 Some young men
were stopped so frequently that a football coach at Thomas Jefferson High School
allowed his players to wear their helmets while leaving practice to signal to police
they were not gang members.167 For these targeted neighborhoods, occupants felt
like they were under siege, unable to leave their homes without the threat of being

157. Stuntz, supra note 143, at 1218.
158. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, STOP AND FRISK: THE HUMAN IMPACT 17 (2012), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/08/the-human-impact-report.pdf.
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/08/the-human-impact-report.pdf.
159. Alex Elkins, The Origins of Stop-and-Frisk, JACOBIN MAG. (May 9, 2015), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/05/stop-and-frisk-dragnet-ferguson-baltimore/.
160. Arthur H. Garrison, NYPD Stop and Frisk, Perceptions of Criminals, Race and the Meaning of
Terry v. Ohio: A Content Analysis of Floyd, et al. v. City of New York, 15 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 65, 84 (2014).
161. Charney et al., supra note 150, at 73–74.
162. See Daniels, et al. v. City of New York, CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS., https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/daniels-et-al-v-city-new-york (last updated Oct. 1, 2012).
163. Ray Rivera et al., A Few Blocks, 4 Years, 52,000 Police Stops, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2010),
https://mobile.nytimes.com/2010/07/12/nyregion/12frisk.html.
164. Dylan Matthews, Here’s What You Need to Know About Stop and Frisk—and Why the Courts
Shut
It
Down,
WASH. POST: WONKBLOG
(Aug.
13,
2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/08/13/heres-what-you-need-to-know-about-stop-and-frisk-and-whythe-courts-shut-it-down/?utm_term=.b4b039e59d98.
165. Ailsa Chang, For City’s Teens, Stop-and-Frisk is Black and White, WNYC.ORG (May 28, 2012),
https://www.wnyc.org/story/212460-city-teenagers-say-stop-and-frisk-all-about-race-and-class/.
166. Id. (“[L]ike they walk past the cops and actually say, ‘Good Morning’ to them.’”)
167. Rivera, supra note 163 (“My players were always calling me saying ‘Coach, the police have
me[.]’”).
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stopped at any time.168 This effect on these neighborhoods was not accidental, either, having been referenced by the Commissioner and Mayor alike.169
At the individual level, the indignity of being stopped extended far past inconvenience. Community members in New York City described these encounters as
traumatic and humiliating, leaving people “feeling unsafe, fearful of police, afraid
to leave their homes, or re-living the experience whenever they see police.”170 The
fear caused many to change the way they lived—dressing or fixing their hair differently, making different transportation plans, and always bringing ID or pieces of
mail to prove identity and legally belonging in that neighborhood when going out
in case of a stop.171 Simply being present in their own neighborhoods was suspect:
If I’m in a group of people, you can’t be in front of the building you
live in. If you show the police officers your ID that says you live [there],
they tell you to go in the house or walk somewhere else; you can’t be here
on the block. They want to kick you off the block. They want to kick you
out the building. We can’t be outside?... So what can we do?172
At the community level, stop-and-frisk in New York led to distrust of police,
where authorities were seen less as protection and more as instruments of control.173 According to a study by the Vera Institute, individuals who were stopped
more frequently were less willing to report future crimes—even if they were the
victims.174 Residents of targeted neighborhoods felt the hostility, and many returned it. Even if there was a short-term effect on crime, the resulting alienation of
young people stopped for no reason may “lead to worse citizens in the future.” 175
The individual is broken down, made to fear interactions with police, and subjected
to the humiliation of a near-suspicionless stop.176 The neighborhood is occupied.
The community is amputated from itself as people fear to leave their homes.
What occurred in New York City provides a dire warning for what happens
when the discretionary power of Terry is used with official policymaker sanction to
target populations of color. However, it is not the only place where community

168. See CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., supra note 158.
169. Devereaux, supra note 3; Floyd v. City of N.Y., 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). See
also Garrison, supra note 160, at 101, 103, n.124. For a discussion of the deterrent effect of stop-and-frisk,
see Robert Apel, On the Deterrent Effect of Stop, Question, and Frisk, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 27 (2015).
170. CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., supra note 158, at 6.
171. Id. at 7.
172. Id. at 19.
173. Id. at 20 (“People from communities of color don’t see NYPD as being there for them or being
there to provide safety or security for them. If anything, they see NYPD in their communities as a form of
keeping control in those communities. And NYPD sees our communities as dangerous.”).
174. Nancy La Vigne et al., Stop and Frisk: Balancing Crime Control with Community Relations,
URB. INST. 19 (2014), https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p306-pub.pdf.
175. Id. at 18.
176. CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS, supra note 170, at 6 (“When they stop you in the street, and then
everybody’s looking... it does degrade you. And then people get the wrong perception of you. That kind of
colors people’s thoughts towards you, might start thinking that you’re into some illegal activity, when you’re
not.”).
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harm has been replicated. Consider Philadelphia, where a class-action lawsuit concerning stop-and-frisk practices was settled in 2011.177 As part of the settlement
terms the Philadelphia Police Department was required to track and release data
on stops, but as of mid-2017, the data continued to suggest that pedestrian stops
were still based on race.178 One woman told Newsweek that she had been stopped
while returning from a drugstore, and then was “ordered . . . to get inside her
house.”179 “‘I wasn’t doing any mischief. That makes me feel like I can’t trust the
police[,]’” she explained.180
Those who have been stopped and frisked based on “reasonable suspicion”—
or who suspect they have been targeted because of their race—may be less upset
about the stop itself than what the stop meant: that the police are not there to
protect them, but are acting on the assumption that their race is somehow predictive of criminality.181 Race-based policing has left deep generational scars. Parents
wrestle with how—or whether—to inform their black sons about the extra attention they may receive from law enforcement.182 The feeling of standing out or being
subject to extra attention by police officers breaks down trust with local authorities,183 leaving many feeling empty “due to the lack of a meaningful relationship
between the police and members of the African-American community.”184
The effect of Terry and its progeny, therefore, is not just that officers now had
the authorization to make stops on less than probable cause—stops that Justice
Warren acknowledged in Terry may be used for minority harassment.185 More than

177. Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11786 (last visited May 1, 2018).
178. Bobby Allyn, Report: Thousands of Pedestrian Stops by Philly Police Illegal, Racially Biased,
WHYY (Mar. 21, 2016), https://whyy.org/articles/report-thousands-of-stops-by-philly-police-illegal-raciallybiased/; Racial Analysis Suggests Philly Police Still Stop Pedestrians Based on Race, ACLU PA. (May 23, 2017),
https://www.aclupa.org/news/2017/05/23/racial-analysis-suggests-philly-police-still-stop-pedestrian; Erica Goode, Philadelphia Defends Policy on Frisking, With Limits, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/us/stop-and-frisk-controls-praised-in-philadelphia.html.
179. Josh Saul, America Has a Stop-and-Frisk Problem. Just Look at Philadelphia, NEWSWEEK (May
18, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/2016/06/10/stop-and-frisk-philadelphia-crisis-reform-police460951.html.
180. Id.
181. M. Rick Turner, The Noxious Effects of Racial Profiling, DAILY PROGRESS (July 15, 2012),
http://www.dailyprogress.com/news/the-noxious-effects-of-racial-profiling/article_cf6213d3-d1fb-573ca41f-4683db3a9bc7.html (“It is often the nature of the interaction with the police that [many African-American men and women in the community] feel most deeply aggrieved about, not the stop itself.”).
182. See Rheana Murray, The Conversation Black Parents Have with Their Kids About Cops, ABC
NEWS
(Dec.
8,
2014),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/conversation-black-parents-kidscops/story?id=27446833; Issac J. Bailey, I Refuse to Have ‘The Talk’ with My Black Son, POLITICO MAG. (Dec.
1, 2015), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/12/why-i-refuse-to-have-the-talk-with-myblack-son-213406.
183. Richard Fausset & P.J. Huffstutter, Black Males’ Fear of Racial Profiling Very Real, Regardless
of Class, L.A. TIMES (July 25, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/25/nation/na-racial-profiling25.
One interviewee revealed that if his house alarm goes off, his wife goes to meet police at their suburban
front gate in a mostly-white neighborhood, fearing that if he goes, “they will mistake him for an intruder.”
Id.
184. Turner, supra note 181.
185. Terry v. Ohio, 391 U.S. 1, 14 n.11 (1968).
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that, Terry widened officers’ discretionary power so much that as crime rates increased in the bigger cities and the war on drugs began,186 the need arose for officers to narrow their focus somehow. This vast amount of discretion has allowed officers to operate on profiles of “the right people” for crimes. 187 Unfortunately, as
envisioned and realized in New York City, this discretionary space to decide who to
stop—when officially sanctioned by policymakers as it was by the NYPD—also has
the side effect of deterring presence: occupying neighborhoods, discouraging residents from being in public, and encouraging them to hide in their homes. As will be
discussed below, state policymakers who are familiar with the power and pervasiveness of local law enforcement can use the tools at their disposal to achieve political goals. In the context of immigration, states wanting to achieve the political
goal of more effective immigration enforcement have learned to make use of the
discretionary power afforded by Terry.
III. STATE IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVES AFTER ARIZONA V. UNITED
STATES: “STOP, FRISK, AND SHOW ME YOUR PAPERS”
Given the tools available to local law enforcement and the presence-deterring
effect of those tools, it is not surprising that states have chosen to co-opt local law
enforcement into immigration enforcement. By the numbers alone, states and policymakers alike are aware of the “force multipl[ying]” power of local law enforcement in enforcing immigration laws.188 However, because the field of immigration
falls under Congress’s plenary power and is enforced through agencies in the Department of Homeland Security, states must tread carefully when stepping into immigration enforcement themselves.189
The focus on local law enforcement as part of immigration enforcement is not
new. When Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA), it included what became known as § 287(g) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), allowing local agencies to partner directly
with the federal government to enforce immigration law. 190 Even before then, ICE
and its predecessor, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), used detainers to formally request that local agencies hold detained individuals for ICE pick
up.191 However, these are federal initiatives that are not mandatory.192 As a result,
local agencies have had discretion to decide whether to partner with the federal
government through these avenues. When city police departments or sheriffs’ offices decline to partner or adopt policies of minimal cooperation with immigration
186. Timeline: America’s War on Drugs, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 2, 2007), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9252490.
187. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F.Supp.2d 540, 602–03 (2013).
188. The Role of State & Local Law Enforcement in Immigration Matters and Reasons to Resist
Sanctuary Policies, FED’N. FOR AM. IMMIGR. REFORM (Jan. 2016), https://fairus.org/issue/illegalimmigration/role-state-local-law-enforcement-immigration-matters-and-reasons-resist.
189. See generally Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394–98 (2012).
190. The 287(g) Program: An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Mar. 15, 2017),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/287g-program-immigration.
191. KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL42690, IMMIGRATION DETAINERS: LEGAL ISSUES 1 (2015).
192. Id. at 12–15. But see infra note 202 (discussing the mandatory Secure Communities program).
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enforcement, but the state governments that fund them want full cooperation with
the federal government, the result is a clash at the state legislative level as the state
government asserts its authority. When Arizona passed its groundbreaking omnibus
bill S.B. 1070 in 2011, the confines of state authority to step into the immigration
enforcement field were tested, leading to few guidelines for states to follow.
In the last decade, states have taken matters into their own hands to address
illegal immigration, citing federal inaction. In 2005, then-Governor of Arizona Janet
Napolitano declared a state of emergency in the state, joining New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson in earmarking funds to combat illegal immigration and drug trafficking; the governors decried the federal government’s failure to secure the southern border.193 By 2010, there were estimates the number of unauthorized immigrants had increased by more than five times since the 1990s. 194 Arizona S.B. 1070
was introduced and passed in early 2010, igniting a wildfire of controversy. 195
Not surprisingly, the wave of immigration enforcement legislation has not
subsided.196 Recently, Texas has stepped into the fray with S.B. 4, another omnibus
bill targeting the same kind of policies S.B. 1070 prohibited.197 Idaho followed suit
shortly thereafter, introducing a near-identical bill.198 This Part examines first the
formal mechanisms for cooperation between local agencies as well as the reasons
many agencies decline to enter into these agreements. This Part then turns to the
rules of the road delineated by Arizona v. United States, sketching out the next
round of legal battles for “sanctuary policies.” Finally, this Part concludes with a
discussion of the modern wave of state legislation, identifying the common threads
of anti-sanctuary legislation.
A. The Impact of Formal Partnerships Between Immigration Agencies and Local
Law Enforcement
Local agencies have a range of partnership options with the federal government for immigration enforcement, most filling in personnel gaps by bringing local
officers on board and authorizing them to enforce immigration laws.199 While direct
partnerships with ICE are not the focus of this Article, the impact of these partnerships on communities has led many entities to avoid cooperation of this sort.200 The
193. Mike Sunnucks, Arizona Governor Declares State of Emergency Along Mexican Border, PHX.
BUS. J. (Aug. 16, 2005), https://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/stories/2005/08/15/daily11.html.
194. Elliot Spagat, Other Border States Shun Arizona’s Immigration Law, NBC NEWS (May 13, 2010),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/37116159#.Wk_VCDdG2Uk.
195. Laura Sullivan, Prison Economics Help Drive Ariz. Immigration Law, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 28,
2010), https://www.npr.org/2010/10/28/130833741/prison-economics-help-drive-ariz-immigration-law.
196. Ann Morse et al., Immigrant Policy Project, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATORS (Aug. 27, 2012),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/omnibus-immigration-legislation.aspx.
197. Julianne Hing, Texas’s SB 4 Is the Most Dramatic State Crackdown Yet on Sanctuary Cities,
NATION (June 1, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/texass-sb-4-dramatic-state-crackdown-yetsanctuary-cities/.
198. Russell, supra note 16.
199. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Deputizing Federal Law Enforcement Personnel Under State Law, HERITAGE
FOUND. 3 (July 12, 2017), https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-07/LM-209_1.pdf.
200. See, e.g., Randy Capps et al., Delegation and Divergence: 287(g) State and Local Immigration
Enforcement, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., (Jan. 2011), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-divergence.pdf.
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resulting policies of limited cooperation are often the target of state legislation trying to enter the immigration enforcement field.201 This section will briefly lay out
the mechanisms for local entities to partner with the federal government and the
impacts these partnerships have had.
The formal mechanisms for partnership with the federal government can be
divided into pre-arrest and post-arrest—i.e., whether the mechanisms kick in before or after a lawful arrest. The post-arrest formal mechanisms are many but center on information sharing and compliance with detainers. Information sharing itself is mandatory through Secure Communities, a program through which an arrestee’s fingerprint information is shared with ICE via the FBI. This information is
checked against immigration databases maintained by the Department of Homeland Security.202 ICE then determines whether to issue a detainer for the individual.203 Once a local agency receives a detainer request from ICE, there is yet another
opportunity for agencies to cooperate with ICE by honoring the detainer request. 204
In a detainer request, ICE requests that the individual in question be held for fortyeight hours—and if ICE does not take custody in that period, that the individual be
released.205
287(g) agreements provide both pre- and post-arrest mechanisms. 206 287(g)
programs are entered into through Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) between ICE
and the local enforcement entity.207 When ICE and local entities partner in official
287(g) programs, local officers are “deputized” and have great latitude to use all the
tools available to them to enforce immigration.208 Deputized officers on the street
are allowed to exercise the same amount of power as ICE officers—question on
reasonable suspicion of alienage, detain on reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence, and warrantless arrest on reasonable suspicion of violation of immigration
law.209

201. See Larkin, supra note 199, at 7.
202. Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/securecommunities (last updated Mar. 20, 2018).
203. Immigration Detainers: An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Mar. 21, 2017),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/immigration-detainers-overview.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S.
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/287g (last updated March 26, 2018).
207. Id.
208. Id. ICE puts 287(g) officers through a four-week basic training program and requires a oneweek refresher course to be completed every two years. Id. Today, ICE has seventy-six MOAs on file with
law enforcement entities in twenty states, and has deputized more than 1,822 local law enforcement officers. Id. The statute authorizes 287(g) programs between the federal government and states as a whole, the
287(g) program model has not been adopted at the state level the way local county authorities and police
departments have. Id.
209. Id.
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Since President Trump took office, the Department of Homeland Security has
focused on expanding 287(g) program agreements and honoring detainer requests.210 However, many jurisdictions refuse to enter into these partnerships, citing the civil rights and social cost. The civil rights cost for communities is well-documented. In 2009, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report identifying significant shortcomings in the 287(g) program, namely the lack of
controls that would allow ICE to make sure the program worked as hoped. 211 The
report also indicated that community concern about racial profiling was prevalent
in a vast majority of the 287(g) jurisdictions examined.212 The Department of Justice,
for example, found such great evidence of civil rights violations in Alamance County,
North Carolina that a lawsuit was filed and their 287(g) status was revoked; there,
the DOJ concluded that deputies targeted Latinos in traffic stops and through checkpoints in Latino neighborhoods.213 In Maricopa County, Arizona, the Department of
Justice brought suit and suspended the 287(g) program after intentional and systematic discrimination against Latinos; this extended from the very first contact
with the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office—Latinos were four to nine times more
likely to be stopped than non-Latinos—to detention at the Maricopa County Jail,
where human rights abuses abounded.214
The social costs are equally great. A study by the Migration Policy Institute
showed that in 287(g)-partnered counties, immigrants avoided public places, distrusted police, and failed to report crimes as frequently—even when they were victims.215 Another survey conducted by the University of Illinois at Chicago and Lake
Research Partners indicated that many Latinos were reluctant to cooperate with
police on other investigations due to fear that their immigration status or that of
people they know would be questioned.216 Every potential encounter with police
could be an “opportunity to investigate . . . immigration status[,]” so Latinos distrusted the very force that should protect them.217 One domestic violence survivor
recounted her mistrust: “‘My family always told me to never call the cops,’ [she]
said. ‘My family told me that the only thing worse than the beatings was the police,

210. David Nakamura, Memos Signed by DHS Secretary Describe Sweeping New Guidelines for
Deporting Illegal Immigrants, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/memos-signed-by-dhs-secretary-describe-sweeping-new-guidelines-for-deporting-illegal-immigrants/2017/02/18/7538c072-f62c-11e6-8d72-263470bf0401_story.html?utm_term=.fd4840762995.
211. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-109, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: BETTER CONTROLS
NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS 4 (2009).
212. Id. at 23.
213. Billy Ball, DOJ Ends Federal Immigration Program in Alamance County, INDY WEEK (Sept. 26,
2012),
https://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/doj-ends-federal-immigration-program-in-alamancecounty/Content?oid=3157331.
214. Department of Justice Files Lawsuit in Arizona Against Maricopa County, Maricopa County
Sheriff’s Office, and Sheriff Joseph Arpaio, U.S. DEP’T JUST. OFF. PUB. AFF. (May 10, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-files-lawsuit-arizona-against-maricopa-county-maricopa-county-sheriff-s; Complaint, United States v. Maricopa Cty. Sheriff’s Office, No. 2:12-cv-00981 (D. Ariz. May 10, 2012).
215. Capps et al., supra note 200, at 43.
216. NIK THEODORE, INSECURE COMMUNITIES: LATINO PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE INVOLVEMENT IN IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT
5–6
(2013),
http://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/INSECURE_COMMUNITIES_REPORT_FINAL.PDF.
217. Id. at 6.
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the deportation.’”218 Many jurisdictions therefore avoid 287(g) partnerships because of the erosion of trust between immigrant communities and their local authorities.219
Even though the opportunities are vast for local entities to partner with the
federal government, the costs are great. Many local entities prefer to maintain good
community relations, citing the need for trust between the Latino community and
the police. Others look at the financial costs—certainly contributed to by liability
exposure from the potential abuses of civil rights that the partnerships are associated with. However, when local entities establish policies of restricting their cooperation with the federal government—and their funding states disagree—a unique
problem emerges: what can states do to curb these policies against enforcement
when entities refuse to directly partner? As discussed in the next section, after Arizona v. United States, the answer is clearer. States, while limited by the confines of
federalism, have the means to enforce immigration indirectly through local enforcement. As a result, states have moved toward using the very tools of policing as tools
of immigration enforcement with the goal of deterring—and erasing—undocumented immigrant presence.
B. Arizona v. United States: The Rules of the Road for State Legislation on
Immigration Enforcement
The direct enforcement methods discussed above have deterred many jurisdictions from partnering; the resulting community distrust even has spurred official
policies of restricted cooperation with immigration authorities. For state legislators
motivated by anti-immigrant political goals, the state authority appears a foolproof
way to strongarm jurisdictions into full cooperation with federal immigration enforcement. However, as learned by Arizona, the way this cooperation is authorized
or mandated can be the difference between a workable provision and one that is
enjoined before enactment. This section aims to explore the rules governing the
immigration enforcement road. It discusses the legislative intent of Arizona S.B.
1070 to eliminate sanctuary policies, its major provisions, as well as the preemption
arguments analyzed by the Supreme Court. This Part explains that after Arizona, the
Court unequivocally established that there was space for states to indirectly enforce
immigration at the local level, and concludes that while many state enforcement
efforts are preempted by federal immigration law, the Court has allowed “Show Me
Your Papers” provisions to stand. States that mandate local officers to ask about
immigration status therefore can use encounters with local law enforcement as a
tool for state enforcement due to § 1373’s federal restriction on the sharing of immigration status information.

218. Karl Fortier, Citizens Ask Sheriff and ICE to Drop Illegal Immigration Detainment Program,
FOX4 (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.fox4now.com/news/local-news/citizens-ask-sheriff-and-ice-to-drop-illegal-immigrant-detainment-program.
219. Antonie Boessenkool, Eric Holder, LAPD Chief Say ‘Sanctuary State’ Bill Will Restore Trust Between Immigrants, Police, L.A. DAILY NEWS (June 19, 2017), http://www.dailynews.com/2017/06/19/ericholder-lapd-chief-say-sanctuary-state-bill-will-restore-trust-between-immigrants-police/.
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When Arizona S.B. 1070 was passed, the bill’s sponsor, Russell Pearce, told
reporters that the bill’s purpose was “to eliminate sanctuary policies[.]”220 Not surprisingly, the purpose of Arizona S.B. 1070 cannot be fully understood without a
discussion of “sanctuary policies.” As noted above, many jurisdictions are so concerned with the potential consequences of being associated with federal immigration enforcement that they enact policies of non-cooperation.221 In broad strokes,
a sanctuary policy is a formal or informal policy adopted by an entity that limits its
own compliance with immigration authorities or enforcement of immigration law,
but these policies can take many forms.222 Some jurisdictions prohibit their officers
from routinely inquiring into immigration status during stops, 223 others do not
honor ICE requests to assume custody of immigrants identified for removal, 224 while
still others heavily restrict ICE presence in jails.225
The concept of “sanctuary” jurisdictions is not new to this era, stretching as
far back as ancient Hebrew culture.226 In the United States, sanctuary policies
sprang up in the 1980s in response to perceived mishandling of Central American
humanitarian crises by the United States government. 227 Today, the term “sanctuary city” has polarizing effects, despite the difficulty of pinning down a definition. 228
Jurisdictions that have policies limiting immigration enforcement may not even call
themselves “sanctuary” jurisdictions because of the attached controversy. 229

220. Howard Fischer Capitol Media Serv., Both Brewer, Pearce Call SB 1070 a Success, TUCSON (Apr.
18, 2011), http://tucson.com/news/local/border/both-brewer-pearce-call-sb-a-success/article_a3cf2637d420-5e4a-83c1-f8a80449ac46.html.
221. Understanding Trust Acts, Community Policing, and “Sanctuary Cities”, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL
(Oct. 10, 2015), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/sanctuary-cities-trust-acts-andcommunity-policing-explained.
222. Some sanctuary policies refuse to comply with ICE requests for detainer of suspects postarrest, while others attempt to assure community members that their immigration status will not be questioned if they report crimes or otherwise interact with the police. Id.
223. Taylor Dobbs, Not ‘Sanctuary City,’ But New Policy Means Burlington Cops Won’t Ask About
Immigration, VT. PUB. RADIO (June 13, 2017), http://digital.vpr.net/post/not-sanctuary-city-new-policymeans-burlington-cops-wont-ask-about-immigration.
224. Alejandra Molina & Brenda Gazzar, How California’s ‘Sanctuary State’ Bill Would Further
Limit ICE’s Ability to Arrest Immigrants, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 28, 2017),
http://www.dailynews.com/2017/07/21/how-californias-sanctuary-state-bill-would-further-limit-icesability-to-arrest-immigrants/.
225. Id.
226. LINDA RABBEN, SANCTUARY AND ASYLUM: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY 32 (UNIV. OF WASH. PRESS
2016).
227. Id. at 131. Many churches nationwide “declared sanctuary”—many of their parishioners
sheltering Central American refugees in their own homes—after the INS declared they would not pursue
suspects into “churches, schools, or hospitals.” Id. at 132–33. Berkeley, California was the first United States
government body to offer sanctuary since the mid-1800s. Id. at 135.
228. See Tal Kopan, What Are Sanctuary Cities, and Can They Be Defunded?, CNN: POL. (Jan. 25,
2017), http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politics/sanctuary-cities-explained.
229. Dobbs, supra note 223. The city of Austin, Texas, for example, does not consider itself a sanctuary city, according to Austin police chief Brian Manley: “[W]e are not a sanctuary city in Austin because
we will enforce laws when individuals commit crimes and we will partner with federal agencies as long as
what we’re working on is something that has a criminal nexus.” Austin Police Address Immigration Enforcement with Community, FOX4 (Feb. 5, 2017), http://www.fox4news.com/news/texas/austin-police-addressimmigration-enforcement-with-community.

2018

ERASING PRESENCE THROUGH REASONABLE SUSPICION: TERRY AND ITS
PROGENY AS A VEHICLE FOR STATE IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT

439

In response to the perceived flagrancy of sanctuary policies, S.B. 1070 was
proposed and passed.230 It was the first of its kind; no state legislative campaign
before it was as strict or ambitious.231 S.B. 1070 began with a sweeping, explicit
statement of intent:
The legislature declares that the intent of this act is to make attrition
through enforcement the public policy of all state and local government
agencies in Arizona. The provisions of this act are intended to work together to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens
and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United
States.232
S.B. 1070 prohibited officials and agencies from having policies that limited or
restricted “enforcement of federal immigration laws to less than the full extent permitted by federal law[,]” or from restricting sharing individuals’ immigration status
with ICE.233 It also required law enforcement officers to make a “reasonable attempt” to find out the immigration status of individuals during any lawful contact if
the officer had reasonable suspicion the individual was unlawfully present in the
country; this provision became known as the “Show Me Your Papers” section of the
bill.234 S.B. 1070 also required agencies to transfer convicted individuals to ICE custody,235 and authorized law enforcement officers to arrest based on probable cause
that an individual was unlawfully present in the country. 236 The bill also created a
criminal violation of state trespassing for undocumented immigrants “present on
any public or private land” in Arizona.237 It allowed officers to stop a vehicle based
on reasonable suspicion that a driver was transporting undocumented immigrants,238 created a misdemeanor for stopping to pick up unauthorized workers, 239
and created an affirmative defense for entrapment for employers who hired unauthorized workers.240 Inter alia, a number of provisions provided for penalties, including waiving of sovereign immunity through a private right of action against an
agency with a policy of limiting immigration enforcement.241

230. Howard Fischer Capitol Media Serv., supra note 220.
231. Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html?ref=us.
232. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act § 1, 2010 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch.
113 (West).
233. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act § 2, 2010 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch.
113 (West).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at § 3.
238. Id. at §§ 4, 5.
239. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act § 5, 2010 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch.
113 (West).
240. Id. at § 6 (providing an affirmative defense for employers to avoid the criminal liability for
knowingly employing unauthorized workers if they worked with law enforcement in sting operations to
catch, prosecute, and deport).
241. Id. at § 2.

440

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 54

After S.B. 1070 was signed into law in April 2010, the federal government filed
suit, challenging whether states had any role at all in immigration enforcement. 242
The Department of Justice’s lawsuit sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the
basis that the state of Arizona was infringing upon a field of regulation exclusively
held by the federal government by stepping into immigration enforcement. 243
While this case played out—and was ultimately heard by the Supreme Court—other
states began to pass their own versions of the omnibus bill. 244
The Justice Department’s challenge of S.B. 1070 was chiefly on grounds of federal preemption under the Supremacy Clause.245 When a state enacts a law stepping beyond territory normally left to the States and into territory regulated by federal law, the federal government may challenge this enactment as preempted. 246
Three types of preemption may be possible. First, express preemption concerns
state laws that clearly disagree with, and therefore are expressly preempted by,
federal law.247 Second, field preemption occurs when federal legislation on a subject occupies so much space in that “field” that it can be inferred that “Congress left
no room for the States to supplement it.”248 Third, conflict preemption may occur
in two ways and focuses on how carrying out the state law affects compliance with
the federal law and its objective. 249 A state law is conflict preempted when it is
physically impossible to comply with both the state and the federal law; a state law
may also be conflict preempted if it stands as an obstacle to the federal law’s objective.250
In Arizona v. United States, the Court examined four provisions of S.B. 1070
for these types of preemption, concluding that all but one attempted to replicate
or extend past the federal scheme. 251 In so concluding, the Court delineated some
clear rules of the road regarding alien registration, immigrant employment, and
warrantless arrests.252 As to the remaining provision—the “Show Me Your Papers”
provision—the Court indicated states could regulate in this manner but did not foreclose applied legal challenges.253
First, the Court was clear that provisions that replicated federal legislative
schemes for immigration enforcement were enjoined. 254 For example, states could
242. Dan Nowicki, Arizona Immigration Law Ripples through History, U.S. Politics, ARIZ. REPUBLIC
(July 25, 2010), http://archive.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2010/07/25/20100725immigration-law-history-politics.html.
243. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, United States v. Arizona,
703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB).
244. Morse et al., supra note 196. Some states attempted to pass similar legislation piecemeal in
hopes of getting some signed into law. Seth Freed Wessler, Bills Modeled After Arizona’s SB 1070 Spread
Through States, COLORLINES (Mar. 2, 2011), https://www.colorlines.com/content/bills-modeled-after-arizonas-sb-1070-spread-through-states.
245. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 243.
246. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012).
247. Id.
248. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
249. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399–400.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 416.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 415.
254. Id.
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not enter the field of alien registration, even if they replicate federal regulations in
state regulation form.255 Section 3 created a new state misdemeanor for “failure to
complete or carry” an alien registration document. 256 The Court ruled that this provision was field preempted by Congress’s full occupation of the field of alien registration.257
Second, the Court ruled that attempts to prohibit undocumented immigrants
from soliciting work were preempted because they not only stepped into a field
occupied by federal immigration schemes but proved an obstacle to achieving that
scheme.258 Section 5(C) criminalized solicitation or application for work by an undocumented immigrant.259 Because Congress intentionally entered the field of employment regulation as applied to immigrants and structured its existing regulation
to penalize not the workers but the employers of undocumented immigrants, Arizona’s attempt to criminalize immigrant workers was federally preempted. 260
Third, the Court ruled that states could not give state officers the same or
more power to enforce immigration as federal officers, by enjoining the provision
authorizing warrantless arrests by state officers based on possible removability. 261
Section 6 gave state police officers the power to arrest without a warrant if they
have probable cause to believe that the subject “has committed any public offense
that makes [him] removable from the United States.” 262 This provision gave state
officers greater power to arrest without a warrant than federal officers have—they
are authorized to arrest without a warrant only if the subject is likely to flee before
a warrant can be obtained—and for that reason was federally preempted by the
process for removal that Congress had established.263
On the other hand, the Court ruled that states were not facially preempted
from mandating their officers to make reasonable attempts to determine immigration status of individuals otherwise lawfully stopped.264 The Court rejected the Government’s arguments about preemption, reasoning that Congress had encouraged
information sharing with ICE, and emphasizing that “reasonable attempts” to gain
this information would not unconstitutionally prolong the stop. 265 Section 2(B) of
S.B. 1070 was not preempted because it was properly limited to avoid Constitutional concerns, and Congress had clearly anticipated and encouraged communica-

255. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 400–402.
256. Id. at 400.
257. Id. at 403.
258. Id. At 406–407.
259. Id. at 403.
260. Id. at 407.
261. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 410.
262. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act § 6, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133883(A)(5) (2010).
263. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2); Arizona, 567 U.S. at 408.
264. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 416.
265. Id. at 413–414.
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tion between state and federal officers regarding suspected immigration violations.266 Therefore, after Arizona, states may mandate reasonable attempts to inquire into and determine immigration status of individuals otherwise lawfully
stopped.267
The significance of the “Show Me Your Papers” provision’s survival cannot be
underestimated, given 8 U.S.C. § 1373, a federal law that keeps government entities
from prohibiting or restricting information sharing of individuals’ immigration status with the federal government.268 In other words, if an undocumented immigrant
is stopped for a traffic violation, and the officer’s routine inquiries do not include
immigration status, there is no information about immigration status to share with
the federal government, and the entity is still in compliance with § 1373. But if the
immigrant is asked her immigration status, the enforcement entity cannot prevent
that officer from transmitting her answer to federal immigration authorities.
By ruling that Arizona’s “Show Me Your Papers” provision was not preempted,
the Court threw open the doors for states to strongarm local enforcement into information gathering for the federal government. Now there would be vast amounts
of immigration status information gathered because it was mandatory. Even though
much of Arizona’s direct immigration enforcement framework was enjoined, the
Supreme Court’s decision on Section 2(B) was still seen as a victory for Arizona and
its goal of “attrition through enforcement.”269 Governor Jan Brewer insisted that
“the heart of Senate Bill 1070 [had] been proven to be constitutional.”270 Litigation
continued after Arizona v. United States, but ultimately the plaintiffs settled with
the state in return for $1.4 million in legal fees and an informal opinion from Arizona’s attorney general that narrowly limited use of Section 2(B). 271 The provision
would remain on the books and the constitutional ramifications of Arizona v. United
States were cemented.
Arizona meant more than delineating what states could do: it established that
there was space within the field of immigration enforcement for states to occupy
with legislation and without partnerships with the federal government.272 By allowing states to mandate immigration inquiry, Arizona gave states the tools to undercut sanctuary policies at the baseline encounter with community members. Any
lawful encounter with the police meant immigration status could be determined,
and any immigration status information could be transmitted to the federal government. The Government’s argument that there was no place for states had been re-

266. Id. at 414–415.
267. Id.
268. 8 U.S.C. § 1373.
269. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act § 1, 2010 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch.
113 (S.B. 1070) (West).
270. M.J. Lee, Brewer: Ariz. Law’s ‘Heart’ Upheld, POLITICO (June 25, 2012), https://www.politico.com/story/2012/06/brewer-scotus-ruling-a-victory-077794.
271. Michael Kiefer, Arizona Settles Final Issues of SB 1070 Legal Fight, AZCENTRAL (Sept. 15, 2016),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/immigration/2016/09/15/arizona-settlement-sb-1070lawsuit-aclu-immigration/90424942/; Elvia Diaz, Diaz:‘Show Me Your Papers’ Still Is the Law, But Now Everyone Is Happy?, AZCENTRAL (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.azcentral.com/story/opinion/oped/elviadiaz/2016/09/19/show-me-your-papers-sb-1070/90435066/.
272. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 413.
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jected outright. Arizona’s goal of “attrition through enforcement” could still be accomplished indirectly. These lessons were observed and taken to heart by states
trying to accomplish the same goal.
C. State Legislation Proliferates and Arizona’s Impact Solidifies
After Arizona, circuit courts now had precedent to apply to the state initiatives
that sprang up alongside S.B. 1070. Predictably, provisions that mimicked Arizona’s—such as the “Show Me Your Papers” provision—were treated as Arizona
instructed,273 but there were other pieces of state legislation that were different
enough for which Arizona could only be an instructive analogy. This section discusses how Arizona was applied to 1070’s contemporaries and examine later efforts
by states to specifically target and punish sanctuary jurisdictions. Then this section
concludes that because Arizona established space for local law enforcement to enforce immigration, state legislatures have built entire anti-sanctuary statutory
schemes on initial encounters between law enforcement and civilians to achieve
the goal of “attrition through enforcement” indirectly.
In late 2012, the Eleventh Circuit applied Arizona to state statutes in Georgia
and Alabama that were signed into law shortly after S.B. 1070. In Georgia, H.B. 87
(“Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act”) contained twin provisions that
the Eleventh Circuit enjoined and allowed.274 The first provision prohibited transporting, moving, harboring, or concealing undocumented immigrants while committing another crime, or inducing undocumented immigrants to enter the state.275
This was enjoined as conflict preempted because the provision replicated federal
regulation.276 The second provision authorized officer investigation into immigration status if the officer had probable cause that the individual committed a crime;
if the individual could not provide identification to verify his immigration status, the
officer was authorized to “take any action authorized by state and federal law[.]”277
In Alabama, H.B. 56 (“Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection
Act”) contained mirror provisions to Sections 3, 6, 5(C), and 2(B), which were enjoined and allowed, respectively, by the Eleventh Circuit. 278
These decisions by the Eleventh Circuit were persuasive in subsequent decisions concerning South Carolina’s Act 69.279 Twin subsections made it a state felony
to transport, move, conceal, harbor, or shelter an undocumented immigrant—and
273. The provisions were typically spared injunction at the district court level and were not at
issue by the time the circuits heard and decided the cases. See generally United States v. South Carolina,
906 F. Supp. 2d 463, 471 (D.S.C. 2012); Ga. Latino All. for Human Rights v. Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250,
1268 (11th Cir. 2012). Injunction was denied for Alabama’s H.B. 56 “Show Me Your Papers” provision before
the Supreme Court heard Arizona; the Ninth Circuit’s dissent to the stay on Arizona’s provision was persuasive for the Alabama Northern District Court. United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1328 (N.D.
Ala.), rev’d in part, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (11th Cir. 2011).
274. Ga. Latino All. for Human Rights, 691 F.3d at 1256.
275. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-200(b), -201(b), -202(b) (West 2018).
276. Ga. Latino All. for Human Rights, 691 F.3d at 1265–66.
277. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-5-100(b), 100(e).
278. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1301.
279. United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 531 (4th Cir. 2013).
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punished the undocumented immigrant for allowing herself to be so transported,
concealed, etc.280 Another section made it a state misdemeanor for adults to fail to
carry a certificate of alien registration, while yet another criminalized having false
identification.281 These subsections were enjoined as preempted due to their similarities to Arizona’s enjoined provisions.282
Other states attempted to pass omnibus legislation like S.B. 1070 but were
unsuccessful. Kansas, for example, introduced legislation about, inter alia, alien registration, verification of lawful status for any public benefit (including licenses issued by the department of wildlife, parks, and tourism), E-Verify, and requiring officers to determine immigration status during any lawful stop. 283 Mississippi introduced two pieces of legislation that included requiring officers to determine immigration status during a lawful stop, schools to verify the immigration status of enrolled children and their parents (and authorized sharing of this information with
ICE), and even any political subdivision of the state to verify immigration status of
anyone entering a “business transaction” with them.284 These bills died in committee.285 By 2013, it looked as though omnibus legislation had fallen out of popularity,
with no omnibus legislation passed between 2014 and mid-2016.286
Today, the tide is coming back in, and the latest wave of legislation targets
sanctuary policies held at the local level. It started in states like North Carolina;
there a 2013 omnibus bill much like Arizona’s was enacted over governor veto, 287
and in 2015 a smaller bill targeting unauthorized immigrant workers was passed,
including a provision prohibiting entities from adopting sanctuary policies, ordinances, or procedures.288 In the first half of 2017, more than 100 bills were proposed in at least 36 states regarding sanctuary policies. 289 In distinct focus today is

280. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9-460(A)–(D) (2012).
281. Id. § 16-17-750; Id. § 17-13-170(B)(2).
282. South Carolina, 720 F.3d at 530–533.
283. Allison Johnston & Ann Morse, 2012 Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions (Jan-Dec
2012), NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/2012-immigration-relatedlaws-jan-december-2012.aspx (last visited May 1, 2018); see H. 2576, 2012 Sess. (Kan.); H. 2578, 2012 Sess.
(Kan.). H.B. 2578 prohibited officers from independently verifying immigration status, requiring them instead to contact the federal government. Notably, a bill introduced later that session also criminalized refusing to answer an officer’s inquiry about date of birth. See H. 2601, 2012 Sess. (Kan.).
284. Johnston & Morse, supra note 283; H. 488, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Miss.); S. 2090, 2012 Reg. Sess.
(Miss.).
285. Johnston & Morse, supra note 283.
286. Ann Morse, 2013 Immigration Report, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 20, 2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/2013-immigration-report.aspx; Ann Morse et al., 2014 Immigration Report, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/2014immigration-report.aspx; Ann Morse et al., Report on 2015 State Immigration Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/report-on-2015-state-immigration-laws.aspx; Ann Morse et al., Report on 2016 State Immigration Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept.
1, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/report-on-2016-state-immigration-laws-januaryjune.aspx.
287. See H.R. 786, 2013 Sess. (N.C.).
288. See H.R. 318, 2015 Sess. (N.C.).
289. Ann Morse & Maria Pimienta, Report on 2017 State Immigration Laws: January-June, NAT’L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 12, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/report-on-2017-state-immigration-laws-january-june.aspx.
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Texas’s S.B. 4 that contained many provisions designed to prevent local entities
from adopting sanctuary policies.290
Bills targeting sanctuary jurisdictions start with broad strokes, prohibiting local entities from having any official policy of restricting immigration enforcement or
compliance.291 Consider the text of Texas S.B. 4’s sanctuary policy provision, replicated in Idaho S.B. 76/198: “A local entity or campus police department may not
adopt, enforce, or endorse a policy under which the entity or department prohibits
or materially limits the enforcement of immigration laws.” 292 Consequences can be
severe. The common thread for these provisions is financial, such as threatening to
withhold state funding to these jurisdictions—as in the proposed Idaho S.B.
76/198.293 The first incarnation of this bill threatened withholding of all funds to an
entity with a sanctuary policy, but a subsequent amendment reduced it to only a
50% loss of state funds.294 Some states go much further than cutting off funding,
such as Texas S.B. 4, which (like S.B. 1070) allows local entities to face civil penalties,
but also permits elected or appointed officials to be removed from office for violation of the provision.295 Still other provisions waive sovereign immunity for sanctuary jurisdictions, like S.B. 4 did “to the extent of liability created.” 296 One such proposed Florida bill, H.B. 9, recently passed its House, and opens sanctuary jurisdictions up to liability if a person is injured by an undocumented immigrant upon proof
that the sanctuary policy resulted “in such alien’s having access to the person injured . . . .”297
Other state provisions prohibit sanctuary policies at the critical pre-arrest
stage by authorizing officers to make immigration status inquiries. While “Show Me
Your Papers” provisions mandate that officers determine the immigration status of
290. Richard Gonzales, Federal Judge Temporarily Blocks SB4, Texas Law Targeting Sanctuary Cities,
NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO
(Aug.
30,
2017),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/08/30/547459673/federal-judge-temporarily-blocks-sb4-texas-law-targeting-sanctuary-cities.
291. Also paired with these broad-strokes policy prohibitions are provisions that mandate postarrest compliance with the federal scheme through information sharing on detained individuals, honoring
detainer requests, and allowing ICE presence in jail. Detainer compliance and information sharing on arrestees has been a major focus of this Administration, and while not the focus of this Article, remains a key
battle to be fought. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, City of Chi. v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d
933 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-5720).
292. TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. § 752.051 (West 2017); H. 76, 64th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2017); H.
198, 64th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2017).
293. Harrison Berry, Bill Banning Idaho Sanctuary Cities Moves Forward Despite Opposition from
Democrats, BOISE WEEKLY (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.boiseweekly.com/boise/bill-banning-idaho-sanctuary-cities-moves-forward-despite-opposition-from-democrats/Content?oid=4055684.
294. Id.
295. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 752.056 (West 2017); Suzanne Gamboa, Texas’ SB4 Immigration Enforcement Law: 5 Things to Know, NBC NEWS: LATINO (May 11, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/texas-sb4-immigration-enforcement-law-5-things-know-n758126. This is not new to S.B. 4; in Arizona,
upon judicial finding that an entity did indeed adopt, enforce, or endorse a sanctuary policy, the entity may
be subject to civil fees up to $5,000 per day for as long as the policy was in effect since the action was filed.
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 11-1051(g) (West 2018).
296. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 752.056(e) (2017).
297. H.R. 9, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017); See also César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Florida Steps into the Anti-Migrant Fray, CRIMMIGRATION (Nov. 10, 2017), http://crimmigration.com/2017/11/10/florida-steps-into-anti-migrant-fray/.
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individuals, the “Can’t Keep Me From Asking” provisions proscribe local entity policies against asking about immigration status.298 In Texas’s capitol city, for example,
Austin Police Department policy prevented officers from asking about immigration
status.299 Texas S.B. 4 aimed to cut those policies out at the root; instead of mandating that officers make a “reasonable attempt” to determine immigration status
(required by Arizona S.B. 1070’s § 2(B)), S.B. 4 prohibited local entities from having
policies preventing an officer from doing so. 300 Both “Show Me Your Papers” and
“Can’t Keep Me From Asking” provisions work with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 as an information-gathering tool, because § 1373 proscribes local enforcement entities from
restricting information sharing on individuals’ immigration status with the federal
government.301
In Texas, S.B. 4 was introduced in the Senate a week after the 2016 Presidential Election.302 By early 2017, Governor Greg Abbott had placed a target on sanctuary cities, declaring that sanctuary cities were an “emergency item” so as to set the
Texas GOP into motion to vote.303 S.B. 4 passed and was signed into law in May
2017, to be effective September 1, 2017.304 The City of El Cenizo filed a complaint a
day after S.B. 4 was signed into law; after the dust of other complaints settled and
cases were consolidated, City of El Cenizo v. State of Texas emerged as the predominant piece of litigation challenging S.B. 4.305 The plaintiffs sought declaratory and
injunctive relief, arguing that the anti-sanctuary provision that prohibited “endorsing” sanctuary policies violated the First Amendment because it required state employees to take positions in favor of limiting immigration enforcement. 306 Plaintiffs
also challenged the anti-sanctuary provision on vagueness under the Due Process
Clause—which “requires that a law give reasonable notice of what conduct it prohibits.”307 Among the other claims was a Fourth Amendment challenge to the requirement that local entities honor all detainer requests, and a preemption challenge to provisions plaintiffs claimed duplicated the federal immigration scheme. 308

298. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 752.053(b) (2017) (“a local entity or campus police department may
not prohibit or materially limit [an officer] . . . from . . . inquiring into the immigration status of a person
under a lawful detention or under arrest”); H. 76, 64th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2017); H.R. 198, 64th Leg.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2017).
299. Tony Cantu, Austin Police Can Now Ask Detainees About Immigration Status Per SB 4, AUSTIN
PATCH (Sept. 27, 2017), https://patch.com/texas/downtownaustin/austin-police-can-now-ask-detaineesimmigration-status-sb-4.
300. Id.
301. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2012).
302. 85(R) History for SB 4, TEX. LEGIS. ONLINE, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=85R&Bill=SB4 (last visited May 1, 2018).
303. Id.; Henry Grabar, Austin vs. Austin, SLATE: METROPOLIS (Feb. 3, 2017),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/metropolis/2017/02/texas_is_trying_to_crack_down_on_sanctuary_cities.html.
304. TEX. LEGIS. ONLINE, supra note 302.
305. Case Profile: City of El Cenizo v. State of Texas, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15825 (last visited May 1, 2018) [hereinafter C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE].
306. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 22, at 11.
307. Id. at 12, ¶ 34.
308. Id. at 13–14.
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The day before the law was to go into effect, the preliminary injunction was
granted as to certain portions of provisions, but much of the bill stayed intact.309 In
particular, District Judge Garcia was persuaded by the vagueness arguments concerning the terms “endorse” and “materially limit,” and agreed with the Fourth
Amendment challenge to the detainer compliance provision. 310 These provisions
were temporarily enjoined.311 However, this left the “Can’t Keep Me From Asking”
provision intact, a fact not lost on the public.312 Within a month, a Fifth Circuit panel
stayed the preliminary injunction on the detainer compliance provision, also clearing the way for local and college police officers to assist federal immigration. 313 Consequently, Austin Police Chief Brian Manley announced a policy change on asking
about immigration status within the department to comply with the law.314 In
March 2018, the Fifth Circuit vacated in large part the district court’s injunctions,
leaving S.B. 4 intact except for the “endorsement” provision.315
After Arizona v. United States, the blueprint for “attrition through enforcement” had been drafted. While the Court established in Arizona that suspicion of
alienage would not create a separate ground for interrogation or arrest, 316 the Court
found no problem with mandated immigration inquiry.317 States could now force
local officers to get the very information sanctuary jurisdictions were avoiding out
of begrudging respect for the mandates of § 1373. As discussed below, the resulting
environment for Latino communities is so uncomfortable that the undocumented
are held in a state of siege, and some are forced to leave.
IV. THE CONFLUENCE OF TERRY’S PROGENY AND STATE LEGISLATION: ERASING
IMMIGRANT PRESENCE
Professor Jeffrey Fagan refers to Terry v. Ohio as a Fourth Amendment “original sin”; by throwing wide the doors of discretion to police officers looking to make
stops “based on the very hunches that worried the Terry Court.”318 If this is Terry’s
“original sin,” then the present sin is the way states have weaponized this tool of
policing to achieve attrition through pre-arrest immigration enforcement. States
have built entire legislative frameworks around co-opting immigration inquiry into
each encounter. States combine Terry’s reasonable suspicion standard with “Show
Me Your Papers” and “Can’t Keep Me From Asking” provisions to indirectly enforce
309. C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 305.
310. City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F. Supp. 3d 744, 812–13 (W.D. Tex. 2017).
311. Id.
312. Gus Bova, Judge Eviscerates Much of Senate Bill 4, But Leaves Intact “Show Me Your Papers”
Provision, TEX. OBSERVER (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.texasobserver.org/judge-senate-bill-4-show-meyour-papers/.
313. Julián Aguilar, Appeals Court Allows More of Texas “Sanctuary Cities” Law to Go into Effect,
TEX. TRIBUNE (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/09/25/appeals-court-allows-more-texassanctuary-cities-law-go-effect/.
314. Cantu, Austin supra note 299.
315. See City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 885 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2018); Julián Aguilar, Federal Appeals
Court’s Ruling Upholds Most of Texas’ “Sanctuary Cities” Law, TEX. TRIBUNE (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/03/13/texas-immigration-sanctuary-cities-law-court/.
316. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 410 (2012).
317. Id. at 415–16.
318. Fagan, supra note 152, at 84.
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immigration law without relying on the criminal justice system. Because the sweeping majority of Terry stops sit outside the legal process when they do not result in
arrests, the result is immigration enforcement that does not rely on the deportation
pipeline; instead, the high volume of nonconsensual encounters into which immigration inquiry is co-opted is feared and avoided by undocumented communities,
resulting in self-deportation.
This Part discusses how the legal confluence of Terry and “Show Me Your Papers” provisions play out, explaining that the immunization of Terry stops that do
not result in an arrest from automatic judicial review provide a legal island ideal for
amplification of anti-sanctuary and anti-immigrant goals. The Part then turn to the
effect this has had on immigrant communities, emphasizing that this is the intent
of state legislatures capitalizing on the confluence of Terry and “Show Me Your Papers” provisions.
A. The Legal Confluence of Terry and Anti-Sanctuary Bills: Criminal Terry Stops as a
Vehicle for Immigration Enforcement
Arizona meant that immigration status could be investigated at the lowest
level encounter with local law enforcement. After Terry, the lowest level encounter
for a lawful stop by local law enforcement required only a very small amount of
suspicion of criminality. Terry stops combine with “Show Me Your Papers” provisions to achieve goals of attrition through enforcement, given the constitutional
cover of “innocent” Terry stops against judicial review. Ultimately, “Show Me Your
Papers” provisions change the very nature of the lowest level encounter; the “Can’t
Keep Me From Asking” provisions inject uncertainty into encounters with law enforcement.
Terry stops can be predicated on thin and contradictory facts—even describing wholly innocent behavior—in supporting a reasonable suspicion of particularized criminality.319 An officer suspecting a crime is about to occur or is occurring
may stop someone without enough evidence to substantiate an arrest for the same.
The vast amount of infractions for which officers can stop, and the feeble amount
of justification required for these stops, means officers must target neighborhoods
and subjects they believe are likely to yield evidence of criminality.320
Reasonable suspicion of crimes associated with poverty—such as loitering, vagrancy, or turnstile jumping321—have disproportionately subjected minorities to a
high volume of non-consensual lawful encounters with police.322 In the immigration
enforcement context, an officer can use reasonable suspicion to lay the foundation
for a lawful, non-consensual encounter with minority immigrants. Consider Ariel

319. Id. at 52. See also supra Section I.B.
320. Harris, supra note 75, at 452.
321. See Brendan Cheney, Manhattan DA Will No Longer Prosecute Turnstile Jumping, POLITICO
(Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/story/2018/02/01/manhattan-da-willno-longer-prosecute-turnstile-jumping-229568; Rebecca Vallas, A Poverty Expert Explains How We Make It
a Crime to Be Poor, TALK POVERTY (Oct. 18, 2017), https://talkpoverty.org/2017/10/18/poverty-expert-explains-make-crime-poor/.
322. Dorothy E. Roberts, Forward: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 790–93 (1999).
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Vences-Lopez in Minneapolis, who was asked for identification on suspicion of fare
evasions; when he indicated he did not have any, the officer inquired into his immigration status.323 Even though in this instance the officer inquired against department policy, if the Minnesota State Legislature had passed “Show Me Your Papers”
or “Can’t Keep Me From Asking” provisions, the officer would be well within his job
description to do so.
States that mandate immigration inquiry piggyback the high-volume of lawful
encounters permitted by the broad power of Terry’s progeny. The practical effect
of “Show Me Your Papers” provisions is the collection of immigration status information to be transmitted to the federal government for compliance with § 1373.
The practical effect of “Can’t Keep Me From Asking” provisions is not different, injecting uncertainty into encounters with law enforcement. If the officer on the beat
already believes that it is not part of her duties to inquire into immigration status,
provisions like this change nothing for her typical encounter. On the other hand, if
the officer harbors prejudices about undocumented individuals (e.g., believes that
those unlawfully present in the United States are criminogenic, take resources from
those lawfully present, or should be deported as soon as possible), such provisions
arm her to enforce a personal agenda of immigration law, which the local entity can
no longer prohibit. However, even before these encounters occur, a state that
passes “Show Me Your Papers” provisions has already co-opted the pervasiveness
of police power to instill and sustain fear of police’s affiliation with immigration authorities.
The confluence of Terry and immigration inquiry provisions is made even more
significant given the way unsuccessful stops stand independent from judicial review. Arrests are subject to probable cause hearings, and discovery of evidence may
be subject to suppression hearings—the danger of an unlawful arrest or of the “fruit
of the poisonous tree,” for example, are significant, warranting independent review. But after Terry stops that yield no evidence of criminality, there is no ready
remedy in criminal procedure for someone who believes that she has been stopped
based on race. There may be a remedy through a § 1983 claim, but barring the use
of excessive force, it is highly unlikely that the stopped individual would pursue such
a claim for one encounter with an officer. As a result, Terry operates as a policing
mechanism that, when not resulting in arrest, is incredibly difficult to address and
remedy.
While states looking to put people in the deportation pipeline have more direct means to do so—287(g) partnerships, arresting immigrants for traffic violations—states can use the dragnet of Terry alongside “Show Me Your Papers” to
achieve the same deterrent effect as was accomplished in New York City, simply
with a different goal and different population in mind.
B. Using Terry as a Sword to Erase Immigrant Populations
Given the power of Terry and its ability to target minority populations with a
mechanism that sits largely outside judicial review, states can piggyback immigration status inquiries on the lowest level of non-consensual encounters with police,
323.

Associated Press, supra note 4.
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achieving erasure of undocumented immigrants. This section examines the deterrent effect of Terry in New York City, as amplified by state policymakers into the aim
of erasure. Because local officers have such excessive discretion to stop on less than
probable cause, state policymakers—through passage of legislative campaigns
aimed at enlisting local officers in immigration enforcement—can therefore use
stops on less than probable cause to deter those who “look like” undocumented
immigrants from leaving their homes without fear of being stopped at any time.
In New York City, these tools were used to accomplish the political goal of
deterring the public presence of young Black and Hispanic men. Stop-and-frisk was
explicitly aimed to deter young Black and Hispanic men from leaving their homes
by imposing the threat they could be stopped at any time.324 Mayor Bloomberg and
Commissioner Kelley repeatedly underlined through press releases, press conferences, and campaign trail assurances that young men of color were inextricably
linked to crime.325 This stop-and-frisk policy had its intended effect; young minority
men knew they could get stopped at any moment.326 An entire generation of young
people grew up incorporating into their routines “the sense that [they] might find
[themselves] up against a wall or on the ground with an officer’s gun at [their]
head[s].”327 Consider the young people stopped on the way to school, coming back
from football practice, or told to go inside if they sat on a bench outside their buildings.328
Attitudes toward immigration have manifested in even more explicit animus
than identifiable in the upper echelons of the NYPD. Anti-immigration sentiment is
hardly new, but there has been a fierce recent resurgence that can be linked to
President Trump’s campaign rhetoric.329 While on the campaign trail, Trump fanned
the flames of anti-Latino sentiment, drawing a direct line between unlawful presence and criminality and capitalizing on resentment of immigrant workers. 330 After

324. Devereaux, supra note 3.
325. Id.; see also Garrison, supra note 160. (Mayor Bloomberg spoke at a Brownsville church in
mid-2012, saying that while the NYPD did not condone racial profiling, the City would not “deny reality”
about the crime reports) (quoting Press Release, Mayor Bloomberg Speaks to Parishioners of the First Baptist Church of Brownsville About How Crime Can be Driven Down even Further While Continuing to Improve
Community Relations (June 10, 2012)); Kate Taylor, Stop-and-Frisk Policy ‘Saves Lives,’ Mayor Tells Black
Congregation, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/11/nyregion/at-black-churchin-brooklyn-bloomberg-defends-stop-and-frisk-policy.html?_r=0.
326. Chang, supra note 165; Nicholas K. Peart, Why Is The NYPD After Me?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec 17,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/sunday/young-black-and-frisked-by-the-nypd.html.
327. Peart, supra note 326.
328. See supra Section I.B.
329. Angelica Quintero, America’s Love-Hate Relationship with Immigrants, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 2,
2017), http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-na-immigration-trends/; Jessica Weiss, Six Months of Hate:
How Anti-Immigrant Sentiment is Affecting Latinos in the United States, UNIVISION (June 14, 2017),
https://www.univision.com/univision-news/united-states/six-months-of-hate-how-anti-immigrant-sentiment-is-affecting-latinos-in-the-united-states.
330. Dominic Tierney, Trump’s Unspeakable Strategy to Erase His Past, ATLANTIC (Feb. 10, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/trumps-unspeakable-strategy-to-erase-hispast/458748/ (“Donald Trump described Mexican immigrants as ‘bringing drugs, they’re bringing crime.
They’re rapists.’”); Elise Foley, Jeff Sessions Says Donald Trump is Mulling Making Undocumented Immigrants ‘Self-Deport’, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/jeff-sessionsdonald-trump-self-deportation_us_57f4f424e4b0325452628ab7.
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his inauguration, his Administration has taken a hard line on undocumented immigrants, encouraging recipients of the now-rescinded DACA program to prepare for
their self-deportation.331
Today, state policymakers encourage local authorities to over-police immigrant communities, counting on local police officers to enforce private agendas of
immigration enforcement by treating immigrants as subordinate and second-class
status citizens.332 Just as the NYPD counted on police officers to buy into the concept of young men of color being criminogenic, states pushing “Can’t Keep Me from
Asking” provisions through their legislatures count on officers to harbor a private
agenda of immigration enforcement. The subtext in these provisions is that officers
like Officer Andy Lamers—the Minneapolis Metro Transit officer who quizzed Ariel
Vences-Lopez on his immigration status while checking fares—exist:333 that there
are officers who would otherwise ask about immigration status but are prohibited
from doing so by local policy. Through “Show Me Your Papers” or “Can’t Keep Me
from Asking” provisions, states symbolically bless the efforts of these local officers
and rely on them to use their wide discretion to stop on less than probable cause
to amplify political goals of deportation. “This policy of no policy gives officers the
freedom to act according to their preferences,” writes Amada Armenta, who spent
more than two years doing field work in Nashville, Tennessee accumulating over
120 hours of ride-alongs.334
Just as the NYPD had the intent and effect of instilling fear into young men of
color that if they left their houses they would be stopped, states passing “Show Me
Your Papers” provisions do so to erase presence. They do so in hopes of creating an
environment so hostile to undocumented immigrants that these populations are
forced to move elsewhere to “self-deport,” in the words of then-Presidential candidate Mitt Romney.335 Kris Kobach, co-author of Arizona S.B. 1070 and a key drafter
of Alabama H.B. 56, described the success of Alabama’s law as having “done a great
service to America”: “‘There haven’t been mass arrests. There aren’t a bunch of
court proceedings. People are simply removing themselves. It’s self-deportation at
no cost to the taxpayer. I’d say that’s a win.’”336 Russell Pearce, another author of
Arizona S.B. 1070, told the Arizona Republic in 2006—four years before S.B. 1070
was signed into law—“‘Disneyland taught us that if you shut down the rides people

331. Cecilia Vega et al., Trump Administration to Dreamers: Prepare to Self-Deport, ABC NEWS
(Sept.
5,
2017),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-administration-dreamers-prepare-deport/story?id=49638263.
332. ARMENTA, supra note 43, at 154, 148.
333. Hirsi, supra note 11.
334. ARMENTA, supra note 43, at 154.
335. Lucy Madison, Romney on Immigration: I’m for ‘Self-Deportation’, CBS NEWS (Jan. 24, 2012),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/romney-on-immigration-im-for-self-deportation/. While Mr. Romney’s
comments mentioned only employment regulations as cause for “self-deportation,” other proponents of
the concept have advocated for “making life in the United States so uncomfortable” that undocumented
immigrants leave voluntarily. Robert Mackey, The Deep Comic Roots of ‘Self-Deportation’, N.Y. TIMES: LEDE
(Feb. 1, 2012), https://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/01/the-deep-comic-roots-of-self-deportation/.
336. George Talbot, Kris Kobach, The Kansas Lawyer behind Alabama’s Immigration Law, AL (Oct.
16, 2011), http://blog.al.com/live/2011/10/kris_kobach_the_kansas_lawyer_1.html.
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leave the amusement park.’”337 After S.B. 1070 was enacted, Pearce crowed that
the undocumented were “‘leaving in caravans’”: “‘I’ve talked to a U-Haul dealer . . .
. He said business has never been better.’” 338
These hostile attitudes are felt deeply by undocumented immigrants and are
being taken to heart by some who decide it is easier to leave than be deported. 339
“‘They’re sending a message that, “You’re not welcome here, we don’t want you
here …. We’re going to find you,”’” one immigrant said, explaining why she and her
family were returning to Mexico.340 When facing her own departure date, another
immigrant revealed the turmoil: “‘I don’t think about it, because I don’t want to go
. . . . I don’t know if this is right or not.’”341
For those who stay, there is deep anxiety as individuals make minute-to-minute decisions in fear of encounters with police and immigration authorities. Families paper over windows and peepholes.342 The physical and mental health of immigrant families is negatively affected as parents cancel doctor’s appointments because of fear of the commute there. 343 Immigrant children suffer from depression
and anxiety, as well as children with problems “eating, sleeping and doing schoolwork.”344 One woman who had been taking English classes at a local college stopped
after Trump was elected and now she stays home, afraid to leave. “‘[W]hen my
children are at school, I stay in the house. My opinion is it’s more fear.’”345 People
are afraid to buy groceries or drop their kids at the bus stop. 346 For mixed status
families—e.g., an undocumented parent of a U.S. citizen child—the fear of a parent’s deportation takes on unique proportions as the “separate legal statuses but
intertwined fates” means a choice between bringing children who may not speak
the language or dividing the family by leaving them behind.347 Even when paths do
not cross with ICE, the fear that this could occur is debilitating. “‘It’s like, you’re
living a happy life . . . . But at the same time, you’re not able to get out of that
337. E.J. Montini, Trump Revives Russell Pearce’s Dream of a Present-Day ‘Operation Wetback’,
AZCENTRAL
(Aug.
31,
2016),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/opinion/op-ed/ejmontini/2016/09/01/montini-donald-trump-russell-pearce-operation-wetback/89685864/.
338. Howard Fischer Capitol Media Services, supra note 220.
339. Brittny Mejia, Leaving America: With Shaky Job Prospects and Trump Promising Crackdowns,
Immigrants Return to Mexico with U.S.-Born Children, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2017),
http://beta.latimes.com/local/la-me-ln-dual-citizenship-20170808-htmlstory.html.
340. Id.
341. Jack Healy, Stay, Hide, or Leave? Hard Choices for Immigrants in the Heartland, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/12/us/stay-hide-or-leave-hard-choices-for-immigrants-in-the-heartland.html?_r=0.
342. Id.
343. Anna Gorman, Fear Compromises the Health, Well-Being of Immigrant Families, Report
Finds, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Dec. 13, 2017), https://khn.org/news/fear-compromises-the-health-well-beingof-immigrant-families-survey-finds/.
344. Id.
345. Kristen Hwang, As American Kids Pour Across the Border, Mexican Schools Struggle to Keep
Up, USA TODAY (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2017/09/05/americankids-pour-across-border-mexican-schools-struggle-keep-up/629458001/.
346. Jim Mustian & Max Muth, Louisiana Illegal Immigrants Face Skyrocketing Deportations, Rising Uncertainty Under Trump Administration, ADVOCATE (Aug. 12, 2017), http://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/politics/article_93180a42-7d1a-11e7-86f0-630976a90d45.html.
347. Brooke Jarvis, ‘Will They Take Me, Too?’, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/14/magazine/will-they-take-me-too.html?_r=0.
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bubble. You’re just there, trapped.’”348 These are the same harmful outcomes
pointed to by studies on 287(g) programs: anxiety, tensions, and mistrust of the
police.349 Those who do not leave avoid public places350 change their driving patterns or change other behavior “to avoid contact with police and other authorities.”351
States that pass “Show Me Your Papers” or “Can’t Keep Me from Asking” provisions are able to, with every encounter between police and undocumented civilian, add bricks in the wall separating immigrant communities from the outside
world. Immigrant communities are already gripped with fear as the Administration
ramps up enforcement at the federal level. Communities stay closely connected
through technology, informing each other through Facebook, text, and phone of ICE
movements.352 Immigrants stay out of sight, taking cabs and Ubers instead of driving, knowing that any interaction with law enforcement can lead to deportation. 353
Provisions that give local officers the state stamp of approval to ask about immigration status—counting on those with anti-immigrant prejudices—amplify these political agendas, making life so fraught that the undocumented are not just encouraged to leave: they are held captive in their own homes unless they do.
For the state legislatures passing this legislation, this is the desired effect. The
consequences for community safety and the economy are significant, spreading the
impact of the 287(g) programs far and wide without the burdens of official partnerships. As learned from studies of 287(g) jurisdictions, when immigrant communities
associate police presence with immigration enforcement, communities distrust
their local law enforcement.354 Immigrants avoid reporting crimes—even when they
are victims—fearing that encounters with police could mean being asked about immigration status and being referred to ICE.355 Seasonal workers avoid states with
these policies, affecting the available worker pool and hurting the state economy. 356
More significantly, the humanitarian effect of the “constant, even urgent source of
stress” on an entire minority population is significant.357 Even though there are
more direct methods than Terry of funneling people into the immigration pipeline,

348. Alene Tchekmedyian, ‘Trapped’: Why One Mexican Woman ‘Self-Deported,’ Long Before
Trump, L.A. TIMES (June 1, 2017), http://www.yorkdispatch.com/story/news/2017/06/01/trapped-whyone-mexican-woman-self-deported-long-before-trump/102377810/.
349. Capps et al., supra note 215, at 44–45.
350. Id. at 43. See also id. at 43 n.117 and accompanying text.
351. Id.
352. Vivian Yee, ‘Please God, Don’t Let Me Get Stopped’: Around Atlanta, No Sanctuary for Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/25/us/atlanta-immigration-arrests.html.
353. Id.
354. Capps et al., supra note 215.
355. Id.
356. Benjamin Powell, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Georgia’s Immigration Law Backfires, FORBES (May 17, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2012/05/17/the-law-of-unintendedconsequences-georgias-immigration-law-backfires/.
357. Samantha Max, Children of Undocumented Parents Are Safe from Deportation, But Not from
Fear, CHI. TRIB. (June 7, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/hoy/chicago/ct-hoy-safe-from-deportationbut-not-from-fear-20170607-story.html.
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for the undocumented immigrant the implication is the same: any encounter with
local law enforcement is equally rife with fear.
Ultimately, and perhaps most importantly, the self-deportation approach to
immigration enforcement reflects a moral and humanitarian void—one that views
non-citizens as non-persons—paving the way for the denial of human rights.358 This
attitude manifests itself innocuously as word choice when discussing those present
unlawfully; consider the words in which supporters and critics of Proposition 187 in
California characterized the objects of the initiative: “illegal aliens” and “undocumented persons,” respectively.359 This attitude manifests in “us vs. them” language,
feeding on and propagating narratives of the “Mexican immigrant as the enemy,”360
the “immigrant welfare problem,” 361 and even the “bad hombres” of which presidential candidate Trump warned.362 There is a “bitter irony”363 in characterizing immigrants as responsible for a state’s economic and social problems given America’s
perceived promise as “a nation of immigrants.”364 But marginalizing—even demonizing—the “other” is not new in America. Consider the American tragedy of slavery,
an original sin providing the foundation of an “underclass culture” in urban America,365 the Jim Crow laws, and the sundown towns.366 Consider the largest official
mass lynching in New Orleans in 1891, not of African-Americans but of eleven Italian
immigrants acquitted of murder; Teddy Roosevelt “famously said [the lynchings]
were ‘a rather good thing.’”367 The moral and humanitarian void displayed when
immigrants are dehumanized—reduced to whether they are legal or not—injures

358. Kristina M. Oven, The Immigrant First as Human: International Human Rights Principles and
Catholic Doctrine as New Moral Guidelines for U.S. Immigration Policy, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS, AND PUB.
POL’Y 499, 500 (1999).
359. Hugh Mehan, The Discourse of the Illegal Immigration Debate: A Case Study in the Politics of
Representation, 8 DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 249, 256–61 (1997) (positing that the difference between “illegal alien”
and “undocumented person” reflects depictions of society as exclusive or inclusive, respectively). See also
David Nakamura, ‘Language As a Weapon’: In Trump Era, Immigration Debate Grows More Heated Over
What Words to Use, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/language-as-aweapon-in-trump-era-immigration-debate-grows-more-heated-over-what-words-touse/2018/01/21/d5d9211a-fd6a-11e7-a46b-a3614530bd87_story.html?utm_term=.654e52ae0f79.
360. Mehan, supra note 359, at 267.
361. Lynn H. Fujiwara, Immigrant Rights are Human Rights: The Reframing of Immigrant Entitlement and Welfare, 52 SOC. PROBS. 79, 80 (2005).
362. Julia Jacobo, Donald Trump Says He Will Get ‘Bad Hombres’ Out of US, ABC NEWS (Oct. 19,
2016), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/donald-trump-bad-hombres-us/story?id=42926041.
363. Oven, supra note 358, at 502.
364. See generally JOHN F. KENNEDY, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS (1964). But see Arica L. Coleman, The
Problem with Calling the U.S. a ‘Nation of Immigrants’, TIME (Mar. 17, 2017), http://time.com/4705179/nation-of-immigrants-problem/.
365. See Glenn C. Loury, An American Tragedy: The Legacy of Slavery Lingers in Our Cities’ Ghettos,
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Mar. 1, 1998), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/an-american-tragedy-the-legacyof-slavery-lingers-in-our-cities-ghettos/.
366. See generally Rhonda Colvin, Traveling While Black: Some Americans are Afraid to Explore
Their Own Country, Concerns that Evoke the Jim Crow-era Green Book, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/national/wp/2018/01/26/feature/traveling-while-black-whysome-americans-are-afraid-to-explore-their-own-country/?utm_term=.38c4a9a90196.
367. Ed Falco, When Italian Immigrants Were ‘The Other’, CNN (July 10, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/10/opinion/falco-italian-immigrants/index.html.
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everyone by laying a foundation for, as so painfully carried out in the history of this
nation, human exploitation and the destruction of communities.368
V. CURRENT CHALLENGES TO CONFRONTING RACIALIZED ENFORCEMENT
Advocacy groups who foresee the deep harms of this confluence face significant challenges in preventing or remedying them. However, because Terry stops
that do not lead to arrests sit outside any formal area of review by the courts
through the Fourth Amendment, advocacy groups must use both litigation and nonlitigation responses, keeping in mind key stakeholders that can be leveraged as well
as the shortcomings of doing so. State legislative campaigns to enforce immigration
at the local level would be less effective with less tools in police officers’ toolboxes
to control the movement of minority community members. However, the Court’s
current composition and recent trends make limiting the scope of Terry v. Ohio extremely unlikely. Even less likely is the ability of litigation to remedy harms experienced by undocumented individuals whose Fourth Amendment rights are violated,
given the inability to suppress identity as the fruit of an unlawful search or seizure.369 This Part will discuss the challenges in litigation responses to the dynamic
of Terry as a sword, lessons learned from successful efforts to challenge abuses of
Terry, and the type of policy advocacy that is possible given the critical stakeholders
that can be engaged.
A. Obstacles to Litigations Challenging Race-Based Policing
Under the Fourth Amendment, the product of an unlawful stop or seizure may
be considered the “fruit of the poisonous tree.”370 However, when pretextual stops
or Terry stops based on specific articulable facts (such as presence in a “high-crime
area” paired with avoiding an encounter with the police) lead to immigration consequences, the usual vehicles for challenging race-based enforcement are not available. Even though policing based on race—and pretextual justification thereof—
runs counter to the heart of the Fourth Amendment, the Court wrote in Whren v.
United States that the remedy for “object[ions] to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.”371 In
immigration, a subject’s identity is sufficient to prove commission of an immigration
violation and cannot be suppressed even as the fruit of a stop unlawful under the
Fourth Amendment372 and under Utah v. Strieff, identity cannot be suppressed. 373
368. See Susan Opotow, Moral Exclusion and Injustice: An Introduction, 46 J. SOC. ISSUES 1, 2 (1990).
369. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016).
370. See supra Part I (briefly discussing the exclusionary rule as laid out in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961)).
371. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
372. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984) (“The
‘body’ or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible
as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation occurred.”). See also Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2064 (defendant stopped by an officer in violation of the Fourth
Amendment was arrested after the officer discovered an outstanding warrant; a search incident to the arrest yielded drugs and paraphernalia; the Court ruled that the drug evidence was sufficiently attenuated
from the “poisonous tree” of the unlawful stop by discovery of the outstanding warrant).
373. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2064.
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Even though these stops may lead to no criminal charges at all, immigration consequences follow when an identity is ascertained. As a result, the Equal Protection
Clause is the most viable litigation response—but as discussed in this section, it
faces significant structural challenges.
There are three key structural challenges to Equal Protection Clause claims
brought by plaintiffs attempting to show racial profiling, especially in the realm of
racialized policing towards undocumented immigrants. The first is procedural. Section 1983 claims concern constitutional matters by definition and therefore, federal
courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over them; for that reason, airtight class action lawsuits must comply strictly with federal pleading standards and the class action rules set out in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23. The second challenge
is substantive—on the merits. To make a claim of racial profiling under the Equal
Protection Clause, plaintiffs must be able to show that they were treated differently
from other similarly situated individuals and if it is due to their race, they must show
that the government action is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.374 The third challenge is strategic; it is often very difficult to find sympathetic ears at the federal district court level, and as shown in Floyd v. City of New
York, judge-shopping may be necessary to find such a pair of ears.375
First, plaintiffs face procedural challenges in the form of heightened pleading
standards and getting classes certified. After the geminate cases Bell Atlantic Corp.
v Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal altered the pleading standard from notice to “plausibility,” heightened pleading standards negatively affected the disposition of civil
rights litigation cases.376 In civil rights cases where policy decision makers are so far
removed from the actual actors that plaintiffs “cannot know or plead essential information with particularity at the outset [of the case] without the benefit of discovery[,]” denying plaintiffs access to discovery endangers vindication of their constitutional and civil rights.377 If the claimed injury by plaintiffs is being stopped disproportionately more than similarly situated white people, there must be adequate
and accessible data (discussed infra) to substantiate this claim at the pleading
stage—before discovery, which would theoretically provide access to documentation on stops.
The procedural challenges also extend to class certification. To certify a class
of plaintiffs, Rule 23 has four requirements: “numerosity, commonality, typicality,
and adequate representation.”378 While numerosity may not be difficult—requiring
only a class large enough that “joinder of all members is impracticable” 379— commonality requires that there be “questions of law or fact common to the class[,]”380
and typicality requires that the injuries suffered by class members be typical of the

374.

Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Equal Protection Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 121, 164

(1989).
375. Macfarlane, supra note 84, at 231.
376. Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 157, 160 (2010).
377. Id. at 158. Cf. Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119 (2011).
378. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349 (2011).
379. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
380. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
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rest of the class.381 In other words, plaintiffs must show that they suffered the same
kind of injury at the hands of the same system and that those chosen to represent
the class present typical injuries.382 In Floyd v. City of New York, the class was certified because the class was large—and ascertainable383—enough based on the available evidence; the plaintiffs set forth common claims of Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment violations; and the class representatives’ injuries arose from the
NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program.384 However, the Judge’s ability to confirm the estimated number of stops—and the amount of constitutionally suspect ones—was
underlined by the sheer body of data plaintiffs provided.385
In the immigration enforcement context, if plaintiffs challenging inquiry provisions claim being stopped disproportionately more than similarly situated white
people because of Latino appearance, the class could theoretically include U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals, and undocumented immigrants. However, without the sheer
amount of data on stops that was available in Floyd v. City of New York, plaintiffs
will have trouble corroborating that these stops occurred—and that they may have
occurred on suspicious constitutional footing. Furthermore, undocumented victims
of crimes are already deterred from reporting crimes because encounters with the
legal system may result in deportation.386 These potential class representatives may
be hesitant to join in a suit because of the media attention and government focus
they may receive, even if they have experienced the most egregious injuries.
Second, challenges confront plaintiffs in showing on the merits that racial profiling has occurred in violation of the Equal Protection Clause through a § 1983
Claim.387 Section 1983 claims are governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983;388 to succeed in a §
1983 claim against a municipality, plaintiffs must show that actions by employees
that caused constitutional injury were “pursuant to official municipal policy.” 389 This

381. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
382. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 349.
383. Floyd v. City of N.Y., 283 F.R.D. 153, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“All persons who since January 31,
2005 have been, or in the future will be, subjected to the New York Police Department’s policies and/or
widespread customs of practices of stopping, or stopping and frisk, persons in the absence of a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that criminal activity has taken, is taking, or is about to take place in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, including persons stopped or stopped and frisked on the basis of being Black or Latino
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
384. Id. at 177.
385. Id. at 172, 164166.
386. Tom Dart, Fearing Deportation, Undocumented Immigrants Wary of Reporting Crimes,
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2017),
https://www.npr.org/2017/05/25/529513771/new-immigration-crackdowns-creating-chilling-effect-oncrime-reporting; Betsy Woodruff, Legal Immigrants Fear Getting Arrested in Court by ICE, DAILY BEAST (Mar.
30, 2017), https://www.thedailybeast.com/legal-immigrants-fear-getting-arrested-in-court-by-ice.
387. Melissa Whitney, The Statistical Evidence of Racial Profiling in Traffic Stops and Searches:
Rethinking the Use of Statistics to Prove Discriminatory Intent, 49 B.C.L. REV. 263, 299 (2008); Galloway,
supra note 374, at 164.
388. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
389. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
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policy can be evidenced through actual “policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.”390 Where the injury is caused by failure to train, the plaintiff must show deliberate indifference by “a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees[,]”391 and may show this deliberate indifference through “conscious disregard for the consequences” of failure to prevent tortious conduct. 392 In Floyd v. City
of New York, the District Judge evaluated a significant amount of intent evidence:
audio recordings of precinct roll calls, statements at meetings regarding data collection, and statements by the high-ranking policymakers in the NYPD.393 This intent
evidence indicated that the stop-and-frisk program was predominantly racially targeted.394
In a challenge of race-based policing in immigration enforcement, plaintiffs
may claim that police officers stop Latino individuals more often than similarly situated white people. There, the challenge is proving that (1) there is an official or
unspoken municipal policy thereof, or (2) the officers engaging in these stops were
improperly trained to an extent indicating deliberate indifference on the part of the
policymakers. When a state, through legislative campaigns, counts on individual officers to enforce private immigration agendas, but the municipality itself does not
have such a policy and its hands are tied by “Can’t Stop Me from Asking” provisions,
plaintiffs will struggle to show deliberate indifference on the part of the policymakers without evidence of a long-term policy like existed in New York City.395
The challenge of establishing a claim on its merits also extends to the Equal
Protection analysis. Generally speaking, a plaintiff may show either that the law or
policy (1) is facially discriminatory,396 (2) is facially neutral but is applied with a discriminatory animus and results in impact on one race over another,397 or (3) is facially neutral but is applied in a clear discriminatory pattern that is “unexplainable
on grounds other than race.”398 In Floyd, as discussed, the discriminatory animus
was easily determined by the large amount of intent evidence. 399 A clear discriminatory pattern was also discernable, as the plaintiffs’ case was built upon the statistical analysis of the data available on stops. 400 The district court concluded that
390. Id. at 694.
391. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011).
392. Bd. of the Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997).
393. Floyd v. City of N.Y., 283 F.R.D. 153, 165167 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
394. Id.
395. Floyd v. City of N.Y., 959 F.Supp.2d 540, 658–59 (2013). Sufficient evidence existed for District
Judge Shira Scheindlin to find “deliberate indifference” because of the two different policies espoused by
the NYPD. Id. at 603. (“Two different policies . . . [existed:] a written policy that prohibits racial profiling and
requires reasonable suspicion for a stop—and another, unwritten policy that encourages officers to focus
their reasonable-suspicion-based stops on ‘the right people, the right time, the right location.’” (footnotes
omitted)).
396. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (“[J]udicial review must begin from the
position that ‘any official action that treats a person differently on account of his race or ethnic origin is
inherently suspect.’”) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 523 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005).
397. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
398. Id.
399. Floyd v. City of N.Y., 959 F.Supp.2d 540, 658–59 (2013).
400. Id. at 660.
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the practice of race-based and otherwise unjustified stops was persistent and widespread, as corroborated by the stop data.401
If the plaintiffs’ claim is that police officers stop Latino individuals more often
than similarly situated white people, the obstacle is being able to present evidence
enough to prove that the policy is facially discriminatory (e.g., policy of encouraging
these types of stops based on race), or that it has significant impact on one race
over another and is accompanied by animus, or it is applied with a clear pattern
that cannot be otherwise explained. Dismissing for a moment the difficulty of establishing that a policy in fact existed, a significant challenge confronts plaintiffs in
gathering evidence to prove animus or discriminatory intent; the Court itself recognized this as a “sensitive inquiry” where evidence may not be available,402 but did
not pave the way for plaintiffs.
Finally, the strategic challenge of finding a sympathetic—but not overtly biased—forum remains, as highlighted by a wrench in the works criticized after Floyd
v. City of New York. In New York City, Floyd was not the first high-profile lawsuit
addressing NYPD’s “stop-and-frisk” policy, but arose after settlement of Daniels v.
City of New York in 2001, a case presided over by Judge Shira Scheindlin in the
Southern District of New York.403 Since arriving on the federal bench career, Judge
Scheindlin had arguably evidenced bias against police; she had given interviews exhibiting a slant against police officers, and, according to a study by the New York
City Mayor’s office, her track record suppressed “evidence on the basis of illegal
police searches far more than any of her colleagues—twice as often as the secondplace judge.”404
Six years after Daniels, the parties returned to her courtroom, the plaintiffs
accusing the NYPD of a resurgence of the stops that precipitated the Daniels case
and settlement.405 Judge Scheindlin declined to re-open the case but suggested that
there might be a “good constitutional case[]” there, indicating that it might be
marked as “related.”406 Because of the “related cases” rule in the District—which
allowed judges to claim priority for newly filed cases related to those already assigned to them, Judge Scheindlin was assigned the subsequently filed Floyd v. City
of New York.407 The judge was criticized for the appearance of bias against police,
and although Floyd was handed to the plaintiffs at the district court level—and the
City subsequently decided to settle it after newly elected Mayor Bill de Blasio entered office408—these criticisms led to the Judge’s removal from the cases deemed
“related” to Daniels.409 Practically speaking, plaintiffs looking to bring a suit in the

401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Macfarlane, supra note 84, at 242.
404. Jeffrey Toobin, Rights and Wrongs, NEW YORKER (May 27, 2013),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/05/27/rights-and-wrongs-2.
405. Macfarlane, supra note 84, at 220.
406. Id. at 220–21.
407. Id. at 222.
408. Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City Will Settle Suits on Stopand-Frisk Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/nyregion/de-blasiostop-and-frisk.html.
409. Macfarlane, supra note 84, at 242.
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Southern District of New York now faced the difficulty of finding a court as hospitable as Judge Scheindlin’s. Likewise, while the “related cases” rule is not unique to
the Southern District of New York, potential class action plaintiffs have an uphill
road in finding a forum where their claims will be heard without appearance of bias
on either side.
These challenges—the requirement for the “right plaintiffs,” the right kind of
municipal policy, sufficient evidence to survive the pleading stage, as well as time
to establish data on police encounters—pose an incredible uphill battle. At present,
the majority of challenges to state legislative provisions are facial, not as-applied,
so for cases to be as successful as Floyd without the suspicious “related cases” rule
and an overly sympathetic judge, there must be significant amounts of data on police encounters from which an unbiased judge may infer racial motivation and impact.
B. The Role and Struggle of Data Collection: Keeping Authorities Accountable
Where a state action concerning immigration enforcement does not explicitly
classify based on race and is not easily vulnerable to an Equal Protection challenge
based on a codified racialized enforcement policy, the best route is establishing by
evidence a clear discriminatory pattern that is “unexplainable on grounds other
than race.”410 To show racial profiling through statistics, plaintiffs must show “that
the disparity cannot be explained by some other nondiscriminatory factor or chance
variations in selecting whom to stop.”411 They must have data of such volume and
specificity by which experts can show this disparity. A successful racial profiling
case, therefore, requires standing on the shoulders of giants before who fought for
comprehensive, meaningful, and transparent data collection. There are significant
hurdles to clear before plaintiffs can utilize a sound body of data in such a case,
culminating in the need for comprehensive tracking at all levels of enforcement.
Data collection for racial profiling analysis requires collecting information “on
the nature, character, and demographics of police enforcement practices.” 412 This
includes an officer’s decision to stop as well as how the officer acts during that stop;
for example, whether subjects were searched, consent was requested, and how
long the encounter lasted.413 Data collection is often required as part of racial profiling settlements to allow for further monitoring, as occurred in NYPD after Daniels
v. City of New York.414 If Daniels had not included this requirement for officers to

410.
411.
412.

Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
Whitney, supra note 387, at 266.
U.S DEP’T OF JUSTICE., A RESOURCE GUIDE ON RACIAL PROFILING DATA COLLECTION SYSTEMS: PROMISING
PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED iii (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/184768.pdf.
413. Id. at 5.
414. Stipulation of Settlement, Daniels v. City of N.Y., 199 F.R.D. 513 (2001) (No. 1:99-cv-01695).
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document their reasons for stop and frisks, Floyd would never have been as successful as it was.415 Some jurisdictions have begun to collect data on stops preemptively in hopes of exonerating themselves before complaints arise. 416 Still, other jurisdictions, like the state of Kansas, require tracking only of racial profiling complaints.417
However, challenges exist for both data collection and analysis. One significant challenge comes when jurisdictions decide to track and analyze data internally.
When handled internally, setting up an effective data collection system can be an
arduous, complicated process, as California has discovered. 418 Some jurisdictions
preemptively track stop data but miss important variables such as factors leading
to reasonable suspicion or cause to stop a vehicle. 419 Others track over a short period of time, using this data to conclude there is no evidence of racial profiling. 420
Still, other jurisdictions track data internally but do not share it, or share it only after
significant redaction.421 Conversely, when data is tracked by external entities, police
departments may face allegations of underreporting stops, and in turn, may discount this data and its methodology as “deeply flawed.”422
Furthermore, even if a sufficiently representative body of data is acquired, a
major hurdle is deciding on an interpretation that properly accounts for all relevant
factors, including policing priorities and the rate of successful stops.423 What constitutes a “sound methodology” for data analysis and how to control for population

415. See Macfarlane, supra note 84, at 221.
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423. Id. Two Connecticut jurisdictions protested external data collection that concluded they had
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“good data” from which to draw conclusions, see Emily Badger, Why It’s So Hard to Study Racial Profiling by
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samples varies widely between scholars and analysts.424 These challenges coalesce
in the trend of “polar opposite answers” based on the same body of data.425
Advocacy groups predicting an uptick of racialized enforcement must now
more than ever call for comprehensive data collection at every level of law enforcement. Data collection still provides the best way to empirically establish the presence of improper, discriminatory motive in racialized enforcement.426 The scattershot of methodologies emphasizes the need for a unified approach, but the first
step is establishing a foundation—a control against which data can be compared
when immigration enforcement provisions are passed and go into effect. This advocacy work should be focused at every level—local, county, and state enforcement
entities—and should include both traffic stops and pedestrian stops so as to accurately reflect the broad discretion given to officers to initiate non-consensual encounters with civilians.427
What made the data in Floyd v. City of New York so unique was the access to
the very database that police entered the data into, and the statistical analysis available from the two most used justifications for stops.428 When filling out UF-250s,
officers could select any number of factors, including, inter alia, “furtive movements” “casing” “evasive actions,” and “suspicious bulge.” 429 These observable suspect behaviors were specific enough for officers to justify in individual cases, but
subjective enough to serve as a basis for conclusion that many of the “furtive movements” stops were based on the bare minimum of stop justification. 430 Furthermore, because the data was required as part of the Daniels settlement, there were

424. See generally Brian R. Jones, Biased-Based Policing in Vermont, 35 VT. L. REV. 925, 940 (2011)
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Assessment of Disparate Treatment by Police, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 485, 487 (2016) (proposing “auditing,” or
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monitor racial disparity).
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426. David A. Harris, The Reality of Racial Disparity in Criminal Justice: The Significance of Data
Collection, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 76 (2003) (arguing that data collection allows police departments the
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430. Id. at 69.
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certain categories of information that were mandatory for tracking—and the data
was turned over regularly to counsel for plaintiffs. 431
Furthermore, because of the wide variation in the jurisdictional application of
data collection, advocacy groups in states seeking to pass immigration enforcement
legislation should look nationally for methodology and standards. One suggestion
is to coordinate with national initiatives such as the National Initiative for Building
Community Trust and Justice, established in 2014 through a Department of Justice
grant, to determine local need and methods to shore up procedural justice. 432 Alternatively, groups may lobby for and craft data collection rules that meet the
NAACP criteria for effective anti-racial profiling bills.433
The challenges to effective data collection provides long odds for immigrant
advocacy groups anticipating racialized enforcement targeting Latinos. With the humanitarian cost of anxiety and fear among immigrant communities, advocacy
groups simply do not have the time required to collect evidence and prove discriminatory animus and impact. At a time when ICE boasts a 37% increase in interior
removals in FY 2017 as compared to 2016,434 every day that immigration enforcement provisions are on the books and carried out in practice is a day of fear and
disruption for immigrant communities. Therefore, the best short-term solution is
preventing these provisions from being enacted in the first place, namely through
engaging immigrant employers in policy change.
C. Engaging Immigrant Employers in Policy Change
For the short-term, the most effective solution to avoid the state-endorsed
dangers of unleashing police officers with personal immigration enforcement agendas is to engage employers of immigrants in the policymaking process. Because the
immediate consequence of deterring immigrant presence is deterring employment
of immigrants, leaders of industries that employ immigrants have skin in the game,
so to speak, by losing potential employees. This approach to policy decisions—if
long-term—flies in the face of moral and humanitarian concerns about treating immigrants as just cogs in the production system. However, it is effective. This section
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reviews the impact of engaging immigrant employers to stop state legislation aimed
to drive out undocumented immigrants.
The writing on the wall is clear: heavily agricultural states suffer when antiimmigrant legislation is pushed through. By the time H.B. 87 was passed in Georgia
in 2011, containing many copycat provisions to Arizona’s S.B. 1070,435 it had faced
significant opposition from the agricultural industry.436 As predicted, by deterring
immigrant presence in the state, the state itself was running off workers the fruit
and vegetable industry needed to harvest crops that otherwise would, and did, rot
in the fields.437 With the agricultural workforce (authorized or unauthorized alike)
shrinking since 2002,438 any risk of worker loss is felt deeply by the industry. In 2011,
a University of Georgia study found, about 11,000 jobs went unfilled in Georgia.439
This deterrence of presence also did not result in “self-deportation” from the country; workers instead found agricultural jobs in less hostile states like North Carolina.440 Likewise, Texas S.B. 4’s impact on the agricultural industry has been amplified by increased ICE presence and the omnipresence of interior checkpoints and
has resulted in agricultural losses in areas further into the interior. 441
Reading the writing on the wall, many states have considered these costs
when preventing the passage of S.B. 1070 copycats, such as in Kentucky and Idaho.
In Idaho, H.B. 76/198 was introduced, a near-carbon copy of S.B. 4 containing the
same “Can’t Keep Me from Asking” and anti-sanctuary policy provisions.442 However, the Idaho Dairymen’s Association, Food Producers of Idaho, and the Idaho
Association of Commerce and Industry worked to lobby against the bill, citing the
bill’s effect on available workers.443 “[W]ithout workers, without somebody that’s
going to be there 12 hours a day, milking your cows, getting dirty, there’s no business[.]”444 The Dairymen’s Association Executive Director publicly announced, “We
435. See supra Part II.
436. Phillip E. Wolgin & Angela Maria Kelley, Your State Can’t Afford It: The Fiscal Impact of States’
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would never be supportive of the bill, and we’re reassessing whether we can remain
neutral . . . .”445 As a result, the agriculture and dairy industry’s lack of support of
S.B. 98/176 was instrumental in the bill dying in committee.446 In Kentucky, for example, S.B. 6 was introduced in 2011 but died in committee after significant concerns about the associated costs—not the least of which was the loss of economic
activity due to losing more than 12,000 jobs. 447
Advocacy groups seeking to avoid the injury of state immigration enforcement
on immigrant communities must address the short-term damage by lobbying with
industry leaders, especially those in agriculture where immigrant presence (or lack
thereof) immediately affects the bottom line, but must be aware of the long-term
damage of relying on these industries to do the policy heavy lifting. Employers can
pay immigrants lower wages to do jobs that Americans do not seek.448 Reliance on
industries to spearhead policy reform equates immigrants with their utility to the
industry—equating deservingness of dignity with productivity. With that in mind,
advocacy groups must work both in the short- and long-term to protect immigrant
communities while preserving their dignity.
VI. CONCLUSION
At the fiftieth anniversary of Terry v. Ohio, the full weight of Terry cannot be
underestimated. Terry lowered the standard required for non-consensual encounters with law enforcement and has been used effectively to deter the presence of
targeted individuals, as shown by the NYPD’s massive stop-and-frisk program. At a
time when state legislatures are testing the confines of federalism, the continued
success of “Show Me Your Papers” and “Can’t Stop Me from Asking” provisions after
Arizona provide a blueprint for states to structure immigration enforcement statutory schemes.
Because “reasonable suspicion” stops can be used to deter presence when
paired with political agendas, states today can rely on the deterrent effect of excessive police discretion in initiating non-consensual encounters. Arizona meant that
immigration status could be investigated at the lowest level encounter with local
law enforcement. After Terry, the lowest level encounter for a lawful stop by local
law enforcement required only a very small amount of suspicion of criminality.
Thus, states build upon Terry’s vast discretion (and ill-defined limits) to achieve the
445. Harrison Berry, Trump’s Clumsy Sweep: Idaho Immigrants Caught in Political Divide, BOISE
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– Regular Session, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/KY/bill/SB6/2011 (last visited May 1, 2018). Significantly,
Kentucky’s racing industry itself has been lobbying Congress to restore a visa exemption in the H2B program
that supplied the industry with seasonal workers with stables. Tom Eblen, Will Trump’s Immigration Policies
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political goal of self-deportation, just as the NYPD relied on the deterrent effect of
Terry to decrease the presence of young men of color. Given the grave impact on
immigrant communities, advocacy groups must come armed in mounting a response to these initiatives.
Because both “Show Me Your Papers” and “Can’t Stop Me from Asking” are
equally likely to survive facial Constitutional challenges based on recent trends and
the confines of federalism laid out in Arizona v. United States, the challenge for advocacy groups is to lay a framework by which the anticipated racialized enforcement can be measured and litigated. This long-term mechanism of data collection,
however, is best coupled with short-term engagement by industries that employ
large immigrant numbers.
Ultimately, the Administration dictates ICE priorities and charts the course for
immigration enforcement. However, state initiatives to encourage “self-deportation” further widen racial rifts between community and authorities when they give
carte blanche to immigration enforcement-minded officers. Advocacy groups and
the public alike must be aware of the effect of the policing tools that states co-opt
to achieve attrition through enforcement. States that enact anti-immigrant legislation will in time discover the grave consequences of immigrant erasure and will
have inflicted countless injuries to Latino communities in the process. Until these
consequences are widely felt, however, advocates must call attention to the efforts
of states to use Terry as a sword to encourage self-deportation—relying on a high
volume of lawful non-consensual encounters to erode trust among immigrant communities—to erase entire communities from the nation of immigrants.

